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CODIFYING SHARI'A:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS, LEGALITY & THE FREEDOM TO INVENT NEW FORMS
Paul H. Robinson, Adnan Zulfiqar, Margaret Kammerud, Michael Orchowski,
Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Adam L. Pollock, Thomas M. O'Brien, John C. Lin, Tom Stenson,
Negar Katirai, J. John Lee, and Marc Aaron Melzer*
Abstract
The United Nations Development Program and the Republic of the Maldives, a small
Muslim country with a constitutional democracy, commissioned this project to craft the country's
first system of codified penal law and sentencing guidelines. This Article describes the special
challenges and opportunities encountered while drafting a penal code based on Shari'a (Islamic
law). On the one hand, such comprehensive codification is more important and more likely to
bring dramatic improvements in the quality of justice than in many other societies, due in large
part to the problems of assuring fair notice and fair adjudication in the uncodified Shari'a-based
system in present use. On the other hand, the challenges of such a project are greater, due in
part to special needs for clarity and simplicity that arise from the relative lack of codification
experience and training. But there turned out to be perhaps unexpected advantages to
undertaking a comprehensive codification project in the Maldives. While the lack of a
codification tradition created difficulties, it also gave drafters the freedom to invent new
codification forms that would be difficult to adopt in a society with an entrenched codification
history.
While it was a concern that any Shari'a-based code could conflict with international
norms, in practice it became apparent that the conflict was not as great as many would expect.
Opportunities for accommodation were available, sometimes through interesting approaches by
which the spirit of the Shari'a rule could be maintained without violating international norms.
In the end, this Shari'a-based penal code drafting project yielded a Draft Code that can bring
greater justice to Maldivians and also provide a useful starting point for modern penal code
drafting in other Muslim countries.
However, the code drafting project also may have much to offer penal code reform in
non-Muslim countries, for the structure and drafting forms invented here often solve problems
that plague most penal codes, even codes of modern format such as those based upon the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which served as the model for most American penal
codes. The challenges of accessible language and format, troublesome ambiguous acquittals,
overlapping offenses, combination offenses, and penal code-integrated sentencing guidelines
have all been addressed.
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PREFACE
In the Summer of 2004, a death in correctional custody and popular dissatisfaction with
many aspects of the criminal justice system sparked large public demonstrations in the Maldives,
a small Islamic constitutional democracy in the Indian Ocean.1 The public unrest, which was part
of a larger movement in support of greater political and human rights in the country,2 prompted
the Maldivian government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to
approach an American law professor with a request that he study and critique all aspects of the
Maldivian criminal justice system and suggest how it might be improved. The Maldives has
some penal laws, originally enacted in 1960, but they do not amount to a code. Robinson's final
report to the government urges many specific reforms, including the drafting of a comprehensive
penal code.
In February, 2005, the Maldivian government produced guidelines for reform of the
criminal justice system outlined in the National Criminal Justice Action Plan (NCJA).3 With
regard to the penal code specifically, the NCJA Plan notes the goal of enacting “a Penal Code
that delivers justice fairly and effectively, in conformity with the principles of Shariah as well as
internationally accepted norms and standards.”4 In addition, the government publicly committed
itself to a series of broader democratic reforms, including the drafting of a new constitution.5
Drafting a new penal code is always a difficult task, but this project promised special
challenges. It would require a synthesis of Islamic law, Maldivian values, and internationallyaccepted norms and standards -- all brought together in a modern penal code format. Before
drafting could begin, the drafters would need to collect, organize, and master all existing
Maldivian statutes touching on criminal law, gain proficiency with relevant principles of Shari'a,
and understand the local values that inform Maldivian norms for criminal liability and
punishment.
Robinson, who has done consulting on criminal code drafting for a number of American
states and countries in many parts of the world, often relies on local staff for the heavy research
required. But, in this instance, because local resources were insufficient to take on the work,
Robinson assembled a research team at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the Criminal
Law Research Group (CLRG), comprised of upper-level law and Ph.D. students chosen for their
exceptional academic performance, with preference given to those with academic backgrounds in
criminal law or Islamic law. The students came from a variety educational, ethnic, and religious
backgrounds. In addition, although the Shari'a component of the project would primarily rely on
expertise in the Maldives, the CLRG supplemented its Islamic law research with aid from Islamic
legal experts in American academia.
The CLRG worked directly with the Attorney General’s office in the Maldives. In
addition, the Maldivian government created two advisory bodies – the Core Group and the larger

1

M ALDIVES CONST . ch. 1 § 7.
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa290012005
3
http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/publications/NCJAP.pdf
4
http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/publications/NCJAP.pdf, at 8.
5
http://www.minivannews.com/news/news.php?id=1477.
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Advisory Group – to guide the drafting process, with the Attorney General’s office serving as the
liaison. The two bodies were comprised of members of the Maldivian legal community
(including judges and defense lawyers), government ministers, and members of the ulama
(community of religious scholars).
The code drafting process involved a number of discrete steps. Upon receiving the
current Maldivian laws and court decisions from the "Core Group,” the CLRG compiled and
categorized all pertaining to crime and punishment into a scheme typical of modern penal codes,
such as the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. All Maldivian statutes were taken into
account in the drafting. Since much if not most of current Maldivian penal law derives from the
Shari'a, the CLRG also researched the writings of respected Muslim jurists, both classical and
contemporary. The authorities relied upon most heavily were approved by the Maldivian
advisory bodies as, in their view, authoritative sources for Islamic legal rulings on penal law.
Four main Islamic legal treatises supplemented the Islamic rulings already present in the current
Maldivian penal code and the legal opinions of the Maldivian ulama.6 Although, special
attention was given to the Shafi'i school, which is dominant in the Maldives, other schools were
not ignored.7 Priority was given to Maldivian interpretations of Islamic law, as embodied in the
current penal law and judicial practice. Current judicial practice was identified through
consultation with members of the Maldivian legal community and the Attorney General's Office.
In addition, the CLRG consulted the criminal codes of other Muslim countries, in particular the
codes of Malaysia and Pakistan, for ideas on how other Muslim countries had addressed these
issues in their codes.
The actual drafting of the Draft Maldivian Penal Code (DMPC) proceeded in stages.
After discussions with members of the Core Group, the CLRG would produce an initial draft,
which would then be reviewed by the Core Group and revised further. Some of the consultation
was done on long-distance conference calls but most of it was done in person, as Robinson and
two members of the Research Group -- usually two different members each time -- would travel
to the Maldives approximately every two months to spend a week meeting with officials and
interested groups, as well as working through ideas and drafts with the Core Group.
Once a draft gained the approval of the Core Group, it was distributed, for comment and
further revision, to members of the Advisory Group. Although English is taught to all

6

These four treatises were: Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri, ‘Umdat al-Salik (Reliance of
the Traveler) (Nuh Ha Mim Keller trans., Amana Publications 1994); Ibn Rushd, Bidayat alMujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid (The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer) I & II (Imran Ahsan Khan
Nyazee trans., Garnet Publishing 1994); Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A
Comparative Study (American Trust Publications 2000); and Ibrahim Ibn Muhammad Ibn Salim
Ibn Duyan, Crime and Punishment Under Hanbali Law (George M. Baroody, trans. Dar al-Salam
1958). The first two sources are medieval legal scholarship, while the latter two are modern.
Each author represents a different legal/ideological school of thought.
7
The Shafi’i school is the dominant school in many of the areas around the Indian
Ocean, including, the Malabar coast of India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Horn of Africa, and
Yemen. The other jurists we most benefitted from, medieval and modern, included Muhammad
Ibn Rushd (Maliki), Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri (Shafi’i), Yahya al-Nawawi (Shafi’i), Abu'l
Hasan Al-Mawardi (Shafi’i), Mohamed El-Awa, Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, and Yusuf Qaradawi.
4

Maldivians, the Draft Code was translated into Dhivehi before its broader circulation. The larger
Advisory Group was comprised of a broad cross-section of Maldivians who had a special interest
in the code project or a role in the criminal justice system, including not only high-ranking
members of the government, but also opposition ministers, religious scholars and judges, one of
whom was the Chief Justice and Chairman of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs.8 The
work continued for approximately a year and a half.
The resulting product included the text of the Draft Penal Code and a detailed Official
Commentary on the text. The Commentary serves to explain how each proposed provision
would function, discusses its corresponding rule in current Maldivian law, if any, and, when
necessary, provides the Shari’a justification for the provision. Also included are tables that list
for each Draft Code provision any corresponding existing Maldivian statute, tables that do the
reverse, giving the Draft Code provision, relevant to each current law provision. Finally, the
project's Final Report also includes "summary grading tables," which collect all offenses and
suboffenses in the Draft Code and arrange them by offense grade so that the Advisory Committee
and legislature can more easily review the judgements of relative seriousness embodied in the
Draft Code's grading judgements.
Even before the project began, the CLRG faced some interesting questions. Should a
non-Muslim professor who is a criminal law codification specialist, not a Shari'a expert, be the
primary organizer of the project? The issue was raised with the Maldivian government, which
felt that it was the modern penal code drafting expertise that they most needed. The Shari'a
expertise of the Maldivians, both in the Core Group and in the Advisory Group, would insure
that the Draft Code remained fully informed by the principles of Shari'a.
A related question was whether Westerners should take such a prominent role in drafting
the penal code of a Muslim country? This was particularly pertinent given the potentially neocolonial undertones of such an endeavor in the current global environment. Our conclusion was
that the Maldivians were capable of deciding what assistance they needed or did not need and
how best it might be provided.
One final question, from the other direction, was whether Westerners committed to liberal
values should involve themselves in drafting a penal code based upon Shari'a, given that Shari'a
can conflict with those values? Some Westerners felt the project would legitimize the most
extreme and, to many Western eyes, the most unjust aspects of Islam. Daniel Pipes, for example,
objected to the project with an "appeal to Professor Robinson to reject the Maldive commission. .
. . The Shari'a needs to be rejected as a state law code, not made prettier."9 Our view was that
the project was worth pursuing because it could bring greater justice to Maldivians. Robinson's
public response to Pipes is reproduced here in the Appendix.

8

In our private and public interactions with him, the Chairman of the Supreme Council
of Islamic Affairs has indicated his continuing support for the DMPC. He has communicated
this support to others as well, including the Attorney General’s office. See email of October 16,
2006 from Attorney General Hasan Saeed to Professor Paul H. Robinson (on file with the JCL).
9
See Daniel Pipes, "U Penn Prof for Shari'a," Front Page Magazine, July 26, 2004, and
Robinson's public response, at
http://www.frontpagemagazine.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=14372, which is reproduced in
the Appendix to this Article.
5

In this Article, we -- the members of the Criminal Law Research Group primarily
responsible for work on the Draft Maldivian Penal Code (DMPC) -- report our experiences in
drafting a penal code for a Muslim nation. Our objective here is not a scholarly exposition on
Shari’a or code drafting, but rather an account of the challenges we faced as draft persons in
helping a Muslim country to enshrine the principles of Shari'a in their modern institutions. We
think there are useful lessons in understanding their struggle to balance, on the one hand, strict
adherence to Shari'a's traditional requirements and, on the other, Shari'a as it has come to govern
their modern lives, shaped as it is by modern interpretations and their own cultural, social, and
political preferences, including their interest in accommodating some international norms. But
beyond Shari'a issues, we think the special challenges of the project are important, because they
required the invention of penal code drafting forms that can be useful to any country, Muslim and
non-Muslim, that seeks to advance justice in a modern world.
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE MALDIVES AND SHARI'A
Understanding the special challenges and opportunities of the project requires a brief
background on both the Maldives and Shari'a.
A. THE REPUBLIC OF THE MALDIVES
The Republic of the Maldives, a former Sultanate in the Indian Ocean, derives its name
from the Sanskrit term meaning “garland of islands.”10 Geographically, the country consists of
1190 islands, grouped into 26 natural atolls, which have been divided into 20 administrative
regions.11 Approximately 200 of the islands are inhabited by a total population of close to
300,000 people. It is estimated that 77% of this population resides in the capital city of Male’.12
The country primarily relies on fishing and tourism for revenue. The main language is Dhivehi,
but English is also spoken in commerce and is the medium of instruction in government schools.
The first wave of settlers in the Maldives are thought to have been Sinhalese who arrived
around the 5th century B.C., although there is some indication that earlier Veddoid and Tamil
populations existed on the islands.13 There is scant knowledge about the Maldives prior to Islam,
but it seems that by the 10th century Theravada Buddhism was the dominant religion on the
islands, with nominal influence of Hinduism in the northern atolls. According to the Maldivian
Ta’rikh, a historical chronicle dating back to the 18th century, in 1153, the Maldivian king
became a Muslim and took the name Sultan Muhammad al-‘Adil. There are different accounts
as to how this Buddhist king came to be Muslim. According to the Maldivian Ta’rikh, a Persian
10

A.D.W. Forbes, Maldives, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 245-246 (1991);
11
See generally A.D.W. Forbes, Maldives, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 245-246
(1991); THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIA , PAKISTAN , BANGLADESH , SRI LANKA ,
NEPAL, BHUTAN AND THE MALDIVES (Francis Robinson, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1989).
12

National Criminal Justice Action Plan 2004-2008, p. 2 (Republic of the Maldives,
2004), available at http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/publications/NCJAP.pdf
13
A.D.W. Forbes, Maldives, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 245-246 (1991);
6

(or Turkish) scholar named Yusuf Shams al-Din Tabrizi was responsible.14 Another account by
the famous Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta (who visited the islands in 1343) suggests that it was a
Maliki scholar, Abu ‘l-Barakat al-Barbari who impressed upon the king the powers of the
Qur’an.15 This may account for the early influence of the Maliki school of law in the Maldives.
In either case, all accounts suggest that the Maldives rapidly became Muslim so that by the 13th
century the entire set of islands was Muslim and is now officially 100% Sunni Muslim by
constitutional mandate.
The Islamic legal school of thought followed prior to 1573 was the Maliki school, which
predominates in North Africa. However, between 1558 and 1573, the Maldives were subjected
to Portugese occupation which resulted in, among other things, a decimation of the prominent
Maliki scholars in the country. Around this time, Muhammad Jamal Din Huvadu, a scholar
trained in Shafi’i law at the learning centers of Yemen, was appointed qadi (judge) by the Sultan.
Eventually, Shafi’i law gained prominence over Maliki law throughout the country and it now
dominates the orthodoxy. In addition to orthodox religious practice, there is still widespread
belief in a religio-magical science known as fandita, which retains a belief in spirits and all
manners of djinns.16
Despite remaining relatively independent since 1573, the Maldives’ legal tradition has
been nominally influenced by three Western colonial powers: the Portuguese (1558), Dutch
(1654) and the British (1796). In 1887, the Maldivian sultan, Ibrahim Nur Din signed an
agreement with the British that made the Maldives a protectorate. The first constitution of the
Maldives was instituted in 1932 and with it the first Republic under Muhammad Amin Didi
(although the Sultanate remained in place for the next twenty-one years).17 In 1965, the Maldives
became independent from their status as a British protectorate and in 1968 the Sultanate was
abolished and a Second Republic formed under the presidency of Ibrahim Nasir. The current
president, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, a graduate of Egypt’s renowned Islamic university AlAzhar, came to power in 1978.18
Today, many judges in the Maldives receive their training at traditional schools in Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, in particular Al-Azhar and Medina University, respectively. The Chief Justice
of the Maldives, who also serves as Chairman of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, is
Mohamed Rasheed Ibrahim, whose legal education is primarily from Egypt and Saudia Arabia
where he spent a total of 17 years. Other judges have received training in Western countries,
Pakistan, and Malaysia.

14

Id.
Official Website of the Republic of the Maldives, see
http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv
16
A.D.W. Forbes, Maldives, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 245 (1991);
17
Id.
18
Official Website of the Republic of the Maldives, see
http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv
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B. THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF SHARI'A
For many non-Muslims today, their primary source of information about Islam and
Shari'a is the news media. But the picture painted there, of Shari'a as a series of fixed, often
brutal rules, differs substantially from the reality. For non-specialists, then, we offer a very brief
background, one that necessarily generalizes and therefor omits nuance and qualification but one
that hopefully will at least improve upon the standard news media account.
Classically, Shari'a refers collectively to the Islamic scripture, the Qur'an, and to the
Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunna. In its broader and “popular” sense, Shari'a has
come to also encompass juristic interpretations (Fiqh) by scholars of the Qur'an and Sunna.19
Muslims believe the Qur'an to be divine revelation bestowed upon the Prophet Muhammad
between the years 610 to 632 CE. Muhammad received the Qur'an in fragments over the course
of this period and is thought to have arranged them according to a divine plan, which is not
chronological. Muslim tradition believes that the canonization of the Qur’an took place soon
after the Prophet Muhammad’s death. The Qur'an consists primarily of stories, historical
narratives, moral guidance, spiritual wisdom, character education, and legal principles and rules.
The stories are similar to many contained in the Bible, dealing with the lives of various prophets
and peoples. Many parts of the Qur'an require familiarity with the Hebrew Bible as the Qur'an
considers itself the last in the line of Abrahamic revelations. Most of the Qur'an is not strictly
legal and, in fact, law comprises a small portion of the overall text. It consists of many chapters,
varying in length and dealing with a diverse range of themes. The Qur'an may comment on a
topic at one point and then revisit it several chapters later. In fact, the Qur'an is one long
discourse with interconnected parts that give it an overall coherent structure.20
Strictly speaking, the Qur'an contains only four express crimes: unlawful sexual
intercourse, accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse, theft, and brigandage.21 Even murder is
technically not a crime in the Qur'an, but a tort. The Qur'an does lay out principles that serve as
guides for rule-making. For instance, when it comes to governance, the Qur'an gives no specifics
on what the structure of a government should be, but comments that all decisions should be made
on the basis of “consultation.” In another instance, the Qur'an notes that “oppression is worse

19

For a discussion of the sources and methodology of Islamic law, see generally
KAMALI, supra note 26; THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM , at xiii (M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
ED . 1982); MAJID KHADDURI & HERBERT J. LIEBESNY , ORIGIN & DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW
(1955); Knut S. Vikør, Between God and the Sultan. A History of Islamic Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
20
For further reading on the Qur’an, see generally, Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the
Qur’an (Minneapolis, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1989); Mustansir Mir, The Coherence of the Qur’an
(Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1986); Farid Esack, The Qur’an: A Short
Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002); W.M. Watt, Introduction to the Qur'an
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970).
21
See, Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from
the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 53.
Peters mentions two other crimes, apostasy and drinking of alcohol, but, as he notes, their
specific punishments arise out of the Prophetic tradition, not the Qur’an.
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than murder” or that if you are “driven by necessity” then there is “no sin for you.” Jurists relied
on these principles to derive further principles and rules to help guide the rule-making process.
The Sunna, or Prophetic Tradition, is made up of two items: written records of Prophetic
action or sayings (Hadith) and perpetual communal practice since the time of Muhammad. After
the first revelation of the Qur'an and towards the end of the Prophetic lifetime, individuals in the
Muslim community began recounting their interactions with the Prophet, particularly those
instances that contained religious instruction. The Prophet after all was considered the model for
Muslims and manifested the Qur'anic commands in practice. Subsequent to the Prophet’s death,
this practice grew with some evidence of hadith collections appearing in the early-8th century and
fully emerging in the late 9th century. Many of these sayings are particularly useful as sources of
legal instruction.22 They generally contain answers to questions raised with the Prophet on a host
of different matters. Some of the sayings are also explanations on particular verses of the Qur'an.
These collections record actions that the Prophet undertook to teach a particular lesson, as well as
expressions of approval or disapproval for an action the Prophet witnessed.23
Fiqh, or scholarly juristic interpretations, comprise the bulk of Shari'a in its broad popular
form. They consist of legal opinions from juristic scholars on a variety of matters, many of
which may not have been elaborated in the Qur'an. This body of literature developed after the
Qur'an and Prophetic Tradition, and its primary function was to interpret these earlier elements.
Only the Qur'an and the Prophetic Tradition are seen as being of a divine source; the fiqh is not.
In formulating these scholarly juristic interpretations, four sources of authority were, and
continue to be, used. The first is the Qur'an itself, which is generally considered the most
important. Every scholarly juristic opinion must either be derived from the Qur'an, or at the very
least, not contradict it. The second source is the Prophetic Tradition, which serves as the
principal supplement to the Qur'an. The third is known as ijma' or consensus of the scholars. A
scholar will give significant weight to the consensus opinion that groups of scholars may have
held on an issue, generally considering older consensus to carry more weight. Of course, there
are different conceptions of “whose” consensus is being spoken of, but it is generally restricted to
individuals within the scholarly class.24 The last source is qiyas, or reasoning by analogy. Here
legal scholars will analogize a situation, which has no clear rule from any of the three above
sources, with another similar situation, for which there is a clear rule, in order to arrive at a
conclusion and hence maintain internal consistency. Other factors considered are ideas like
societal welfare (maslaha), juristic preference (istihsan), and custom (‘urf), but their use is more

22

Id. at 9.
For further reading on the Prophetic Tradition, see generally, Muhammad Zubayr
Siddiqi, Hadith Literature: Its Origins, Development and Special Features (Oxford: Islamic Texts
Society, 1993);
24
For an overview of ijma‘, see, Ahmad Hasan, The Doctrine of Ijma’ in Islam: A Study
of the Juridical Principle of Consensus (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan 2003), pp. 72-81. More
restrictive views on ijma‘ can be found in: Ibn Hazm, Kitab Al-Muhalla (Sharh al-Mujalla)
(Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-Arabi, 2001), p. 120; Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, Mizan (Lahore: Dar
al-Ishraq, 2001).
23
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restricted and controversial.25 Historically, and to some extent in modern times, legal scholars
functioned in a way similar to the American Legal Institute in that they had no binding authority,
but their opinions were seriously considered as persuasive precedent by government judges.
However, lay Muslims consider these scholarly opinions as fundamental to providing legal
details of the faith and often elevate them to a position of mandatory law in their personal lives.
To summarize, Shari'a is not simply a collection of fixed rules, but rather a narrative to be
interpreted in a way that draws from it God’s meaning. Indeed, it is not a series of fixed rules at
all but more a body of principles and a variety of juristic interpretations that can be remarkably
accommodating when engaged by a code-drafter attuned to modern forms and sensibilities. In
some respects, Shari'a is akin to the Anglo-American common law system in which judges
derived rules from principles developed in and expressed by earlier case decisions.26 That is, the
application of law requires an interpretive act: from a variety of specific rules or principles -case decisions at common law, Qur’anic passages in Shari'a -- a more general principle is
derived, from which in turn can be derived a specific rule not explicitly provided in the Qur'an.
The fixed rules of Shari'a commonly reported in the media are the special hudud offenses,
which have been categorized together under this title by Muslim jurists because of their specific
mention in the Qur’an. But Shari'a scholars argue over the proper meaning of even these
passages – in a debate parallel to the American debate over Constitutional interpretation. Should
the interpretation be based on an application today of the literal language written or spoken
fourteen centuries ago?27 Or, are the Qur'anic passages to be applied in a way that brings the
spirit and principle of the passages to the realities of modernity?28
II. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The nature of the Shari'a, as described above, is the root of many of the special challenges
and opportunities the project offered. The fact that much of Shari'a is, in essence, a set of
guiding principles, rather than unbending rules, has dramatic implications for the drafting of a

25

For an overview of this subject, see generally, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles
of Islamic Jurisprudence (Oxford: Islamic Texts Society, 3rd ed. 2005); Imran Ahsan Khan
Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh)(Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute Press, 2000);
and, Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni usul al-fiqh
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
26
It is unlike the common law system, of course, in that case decisions cannot be used as
mandatory precedent, but can be used as persuasive precedent. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 196-97 (1991).
27
See generally MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SUNNAH (1998);
YUSUF AL-QARADAWI, THE LAWFUL AND THE PROHIBITED IN ISLAM (1982). (There are not two
mutually exclusive camps. Most scholars, including the two just mentioned, fall somewhere
between the two extremes, embracing both the literal word and the realities of modernity.)
28
See generally FARID ESACK, QUR’AN , LIBERATION AND PLURALISM (1997); FAZLUR
RAHMAN , ISLAM (1979); MOHAMMAD ARKOUN , RETHINKING ISLAM : COMMON QUESTIONS,
UNCOMMON ANSWERS (1994).
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Shari'a-based modern penal code.29 It gives code drafters and religious scholars elbow room
when translating those principles into modern penal code provisions. Further, the Islamic
tradition is not monolithic and thus contains a variety of interpretations. This flexibility was
central, as Part III of this Article demonstrates, when the drafting sought to deal with the
potential conflicts between Shari'a and international norms, sometimes having to find creative
ways to accommodate the two. The resulting Draft Code may not be one that other nations
would adopt as it is -- even the Maldivians no doubt will make further adjustments as they debate
the Draft Code in the Majlis (Parliament). What the Draft Code seeks to do is to embody
Maldivian values, not the values of any other nation. And of course, in a working democracy
that is as it should be: it is a code by which the Maldivians bind themselves, not us. Ultimately,
some people will have pause about some of the provisions, but we think the nature and extent of
the departures from Western sensibilities will be less than most assume.
The single most significant advance made was with the initial Maldivian decision to
codify. Codification in itself insures a marked improvement in the availability of justice and,
specifically, in adherence to the legality principle.30 Indeed, the reader will see that the Draft
Maldivian Penal Code surpasses all existing codes – Eastern or Western – in promoting key
aspects of legality: giving fair notice of what is prohibited, limiting unfettered discretion,
increasing uniformity in application to similar cases, and reserving criminalization authority to
the more democratic legislative branch.31
We understood from the start the importance of the Maldivian decision to codify.
However, we did not understand, until we were in the midst of the project, that it offered
unexpected opportunities for improving criminal codes generally. The Maldives does not have,
and Muslim countries as a group tend not to have, a strong codification tradition. As a result, we
had the opportunity, indeed were sometimes required by necessity, to invent drafting forms quite
different from what has been used before in modern criminal codes. Thus, the project provided
greater opportunities for improving the criminal code's operation than would have been available
if undertaken in the United States or in another country with a substantial codification tradition.
Generally speaking, Islamic law and its relation to the state have gone through five main
stages. In the first stage, during the earliest days of Islam, one can argue that the Islamic state
retained the ability to legislate according to Shari'a. Umar bin Khattab, the third ruler of the
Muslim polity (from 634-644 CE) after the Prophet Muhammad and Abu Bakr, is known to have

29

Any codification of Shari’a raises interesting conceptual issues of whether the
doctrinal diversity and inductive style of traditional Shari'a is consistent with codification, with
its implied deductive system, and whether any costs of the shift to codification are outweighed by
the benefits of legality that it reaps. For a discussion of those benefits, see Part IV. Presumably,
the context of Islamic law, which developed in pre-modern societies with weak governments, has
changed in modern times with strong central governments. Although we do not discount the
importance of these issues, they were issues that were decided by the Maldivians before they ever
commissioned our project.
30
See infra Part IV.
31
For a general discussion of the "legality principle" and its virtues, see Paul H.
Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA . L. REV . 335,
336-368 (2005).
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instituted a significant number of “rules” during his reign. Some of these related to religious
issues, while many seem to have focused on secular public policy.32
The second stage, which has defined the majority of Islamic history, occurred around the
beginning of the 8th Century, when legal expertise began to reside outside of official government
authorities and non-binding Islamic legislation emerged from independent juristic scholars.33 In
fact, the “first signs” that judges should consult experts other than themselves with regard to the
law emerged around the beginning of the 8th Century.34 The third stage occurred with the
emergence of Muslims states (above all the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires) that asserted
control over aspects of the Islamic legal system that had previously been largely private or had at
least escaped government control. During the late 19th Century, the Ottomans began to introduce
elements of a European codification framework into their system, eventually formulating the
Majalla or Ottoman Civil Code (1869-1876) whose content was based upon the Hanafi school of
law.35 The fourth stage occurred during the period of Islam’s encounter with Western nations.
During this period, Islamic law was characterized by the French and British colonization of the
Muslim world and the introduction of European codes, as well as, the codification of some
Islamic rules.36 In countries like Egypt, this involved administering codes of statutory law
through a centralized court system.37 Unfortunately, these codes often embodied European
norms as opposed to Islamic norms, reflecting a process that did not involve consultation with
leading Islamic jurists in the country.38
The final stage came in the early 1970s with the increased Islamization of law in
countries like Libya, Iran, Sudan and Pakistan as a means of countering the distinct European
flavor of the legal systems in these nations.39 Similar demands were also being made in Egypt,
particularly in relation to preserving the place of Islamic law through the nation’s constitution.40

32

W AEL HALLAQ , THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 32-33 (2005).
See id. at 63 (“The locus of legal expertise, therefore, was not the qâdîs, but rather a
group of private individuals . . . .”).
34
Id. at 62.
35
Aharon Layish, The Transformation of the Shari'a from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law
in the Contemporary Muslim World, 44 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 1, 3 (2004); Chilbi Mallat, From
Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field (Part II), 52 AM . J. COMP. L. 209,
277 (2004).
36
Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in
American Academia, 52 AM . J. COMP. L. 789, 800 n.27 (2004).
37
Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to the
Shari Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with
the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM . U. INT ’L L. REV . 379, 388 (2006).
38
See id. at 388 (discussing the reason for the failure of Egypt's attempt at comprehensive
codification in 1882).
39
Layish, supra 33, at 15.
40
See Lombardi & Brown, supra 35, at 389.
33
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The Draft Maldivian Penal Code project potentially represents a sixth stage in the relationship of
Shari'a and the Muslim state.
Although codification has existed in the Muslim world, the Draft Maldivian Penal Code
project is unique for several reasons. First, most codification in the Muslim world has taken
place with civil codes, not criminal codes. Criminal codes have largely been modified or
Islamicized through piece-meal introduction of certain Islamic punishments into pre-existing
codes. The Draft Maldivian Penal Code, however, adopts a comprehensive approach to
codifying criminal law.41 Second, some of the previous codifications in Muslim countries came
as a result of modifying an already present European code. The Maldives have no European code
in place, hence, this project began on a clean slate. As a result, Islamic norms guided the project,
not European ones. Finally, unlike other codifications in the Muslim world, procedurally,
ratification of the Draft Maldivian Penal Code, if it occurs, will be representative and not
autocratic, involving public debate in the legislature.42
Thus, the lack of a codification tradition had significant advantages for the drafting
project because code structure and drafting forms in the Maldives were not set. The past halfcentury of worldwide penal code reform has taught a good deal about what does and does not
work in penal code drafting. Yet jurisdictions that have previously existing codes are hesitant to
deviate from the structure and drafting forms to which they have become accustomed, even when
better structures have been developed. With little codification history, however, the Maldives
and its Shari'a-based system presents no such barrier to drafters, who can look to whatever
structures and forms work best or can invent new ones as the need arises.
On the other hand, the special opportunities presented by the lack of a codification
tradition brought with it special challenges. The lack of codification experience meant that
lawyers and judges were generally ill-prepared for a shift to a comprehensive code system, a
problem exacerbated by a general lack of legal training. This lack of training among judges is
particularly problematic in the courts located outside of the capital island of Male. In addition to
the Criminal Court and other courts in Male, there are 204 Island Courts spread out among the
200 inhabited islands in the Maldives.43 These courts are headed by magistrates and a 2003 study
showed that only 2 of the 188 magistrates held their first degree in law. The vast majority of
them hold only a local certificate.44 This meant that one of the primary drafting principles was to
41

Some contemporary academics specializing in Islamic law have strong objections to its
codification because they see it as inconsistent with the philosophical underpinnings of Shari'a.
See, for example, Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni
Usul al-Fiqh 260 (1997). This was not, however, the view taken by the Maldivian government.
42
On February 23, 2006, President Gayoom placed the Draft Penal Code on the
parliamentary agenda. See, http://mirror.undp.org/maldives.
43
See Ministry of Justice (Maldives), Justice Human Resource Development Plan, 20042008, at 22.
44
Id. at 22-23; see also id. ("Very few magistrates have a degree in law (In the 204 Island
Courts, 3 persons has [sic] tertiary education, 2 in law and 1 in psychology) and most are locally
trained up to a certain level. The training of magistrates in the legal field was strengthened
recently [through increased local legal training] . . . . However it is preferable for even
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keep the drafting forms simple and user-friendly. Furthermore, in the Maldives in particular,
simplicity and accessability was of special urgency because the country is comprised of hundreds
of islands45 and the communication facilities are not always good.46 It is not uncommon for the
ranking government official responsible for an island to have no legal training yet be called upon
to apply the law's provisions.
Another special challenge arose from Shari'a’s greater role in the social lives of the
population, as compared to law in Western countries. This meant that the Draft Code required a
broader range of offenses and needed to account for its greater social obligations. So, for
example, there was a need for a verdict system that better communicates the grounds for an
acquittal, indicating whether the acquittal is based upon a theory of justification, which
announces the conduct in the case as “proper,” or a theory of excuse, which condemns the
conduct but excuses the actor. The distinction is key if law is to signal to the community what
the case at hand means for future conduct and for reinforcing norms.47
The specifics of these special challenges -- the need for a code that is at once more
encompassing and yet simple and accessible -- and how we responded to those challenges are the
subjects of Parts IV through IX. Specifically, Parts IV and V explain how we used past lessons
or invented new forms to promote a clearer and more accessible penal code through plain
language drafting and standardized drafting templates. Part VI describes the unique verdict
system created for the Maldives, which unambiguously labels the different reasons for an
acquittal, this labeling avoids the debilitating confusion regarding norms that can sometimes
come with an acquittal, or that sometimes works to block an acquittal when it is deserved. Part
VII explains the complicating problems that arise from overlapping offenses and how the
freedom from old drafting forms allowed us to minimize the problem. Part VIII describes how
we tackled the related problem of combination offenses, such as robbery and burglary, which are
common in the Anglo-American system but which we were able to avoid in the Draft Code.
Finally, Part IX describes our solution to the particularly challenging problem of creating a
sentencing guideline system that would be both simple in its application but also could answer
the special need for uniform application in a country of many islands. The full text and official
commentary of the Draft Maldivian Penal Code are available online.48

44

(...continued)
magistrates to have a degree or diploma level qualification in law.").
45
See generally C.H.B. Reynolds, Maldives, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 245 (1991);
THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIA , PAKISTAN , BANGLADESH , SRI LANKA , NEPAL,
BHUTAN AND THE MALDIVES (Francis Robinson, ed., Cambridge University Press, 1989).
46
See Ministry of Justice (Maldives), supra note 43, at 23 ("The biggest challenges for
the [Island] Courts are existence of limited or no proper communication facilities which is
essential for contacting the Ministry who is ultimately responsible for management of Courts.").
47
For a discussion of this distinction and its importance in announcing rules of conduct
for future conduct, see PAUL H. ROBINSON , STRUCTURE & FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 145-146,
204-207 (1997). The proposed verdict system is discussed in Part VI infra.
48
The Report containing the Draft Code and its Official Commentary, respectively,
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The problems and their solutions discussed in Parts IV through IX relate primarily to our
expertise in criminal code drafting. But one of the contributions we were able to make to the
project was of a different sort: using our understanding of both principles of Shari'a and
international norms to bridge the gap between the two.
III. SHARI'A AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS:
THEIR TENSION AND ITS RESOLUTION
While the popular Western view tends to focus on what seem to be significant differences
between Western penal law and Shari'a, it is also true that there are many similarities.49 The two
are based on traditions with similar origins,50 and contain many similar offenses and defenses.51
Nonetheless, there are important differences. Shari'a is more rooted in religion, while Western
law’s base is arguably more secular.52 Because Shari’a’s primary source is understood to be

48

(...continued)

appear at:
http://www.mv.undp.org/projects/governance/Penal%20Code%20%20Final%20Report%20%20Volume%201.pdf
http://www.mv.undp.org/projects/governance/Penal%20Code%20%20Final%20Report%20%20Volume%202.pdf
The Draft Code and Official Commentary can also be found at:
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/draftislamicpenalcode/
49
For a claim of convergence between Western norms and Islam generally, see Melanie
D. Reed, Western Democracy and Islamic Tradition: The Application of Shari'a in a Modern
World, 19 AM . U. INT 'L L. REV . 485, 496 (2004) ("In fact, Islam shares several ideals with
Western notions of justice, including human dignity, fundamental human rights, ideas of natural
justice, and the rule of law.").
50
As a member of the "Abrahamic" family of religions, Islamic tradition is not far
removed from the Judeo-Christian tradition with which it maintains strong ties. F.E. PETERS, A
READER ON CLASSICAL ISLAM 158-59 (1994).
51
For example, both systems provide justification defenses such as lesser evils, self
defense, and defense of property. Compare PAUL H. ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW § 8.1 (1997)
[hereinafter ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW ] (describing justification defenses recognized under
American law), with IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE , GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 143
(2000) (discussing justification defenses under Islamic law), and IMAM NAWAWI,
MINHAJ-AT -TALIBIN : A MANUAL OF MOHAMMEDAN LAW ACCORDING TO THE SCHOOL OF
SHAFI'I 453 (E.C. Howard trans., 1914).
52
The Qur'an is the primary source of Islamic law. The Prophetic tradition, Sunna, is
seen as the main source after the Qur'an. The law is derived from these sources on the basis of
the interpretative methodologies of various religious scholars. See supra Part II. Religion is not
the ultimate authority in Western law, and while religious texts have influenced some Western
law, for instance American law, they are not the principle basis for it. Some Muslim scholars
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divine and unalterable,53 its content is more resistant to change.54 In Islam, law is "an integral
aspect of religion" that prescribes "not only universal moral principles but details of how man
should conduct his life."55 Thus, Shari’a extends into spheres untouched by Western law.56
Additionally, unlike some Western cultures, Shari’a tends to place a greater emphasis on the
community over the individual.57 Because individual action can have ramifications for the
community as a whole, Islamic legal rules extend to the most personal and intimate matters, even
while retaining a respect for privacy.
With regard to international norms, as opposed to Western norms, much of Shari'a is
consistent with the standards of the international community.58 However, there are also
important points of conflict that had to be resolved in order to achieve the dual aims outlined in
the Maldives’ National Criminal Justice Action Plan: conformity with both Shari'a and
“internationally accepted norms and standards.” Hence, each point of conflict required attention.
The conflict, and its resolution, raised not only political but also practical
considerations. To maintain its moral credibility with the population, a penal code cannot
deviate too far from that community's shared notions of justice.59 Clearly, many aspects of
52

(...continued)
consider the fundamental difference between Islamic law and Western law to be the fact that, in
Western law, human reason is unrestricted in its ability to create law, whereas, in Islamic law, the
"divine will" is the ultimate arbitrator. NYAZEE , supra note 51, at 31.
53
Shari’a, in its narrow sense, has the "sanctifying authority of revelation" attached to it.
SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, IDEALS AND REALITIES OF ISLAM 95 (Mandala 1991) (1966). The
Muslim juristic enterprise throughout its fourteen hundred years has primarily attempted to
understand or build upon this legal foundation. RAHMAN , supra note 28, at 69.
54
For example, complete removal of the hudud punishments outlined in the Qur'an and
traditions of the Prophet meets exceedingly strong resistance. See MOHAMMED WAQAR
UL-HAQ , ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAWS: HUDOOD LAWS & RULES 23 (1994) (suggesting that
although hudud punishments should be avoided, they cannot be completely removed in the
Pakistani context); RUUD PETERS, ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW IN NIGERIA 14-15 (2003) (discussing
the Islamicization process in Northern Nigeria). Imposition of hudud punishments often go hand
in hand with the particular political climate at that time.
55
N ASR, supra note 53, at 95.
56
Although Western and Islamic law both govern the relationships between individuals
and communities, Islamic systems introduce two new elements into consideration: individual
and communal relationships with God. See IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE , OUTLINES OF ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE 23 (2000).
57
Reed, supra note 48, at 493 ("Islam begins with the premise that individuals have
obligations to each other, without which individual rights are unachievable.").
58
By “international norms” we refer to the international human rights norms embodied in
key international treaty law and articulated by the UN and major international human rights
tribunals.
59
See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW . U. L.
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Shari'a have been internalized by the Maldivian community, yet Maldivians also seem to be
concerned with conforming to international norms. What can penal code drafters do to help
resolve the points where the two conflict?
Some of the conflicts had already been resolved in the formulation of existing Maldivan
penal law, where Maldivians adopted criminal law rules that depart from traditional
interpretations of Shari'a. Other conflicts were resolved in the Draft Code by finding some
device by which the conflicting views could be reconciled. In the end, however, there remain
some important respects in which the Draft Code continues to deviate from international norms,60
although those respects are probably less dramatic than most readers would expect in a Shari'abased penal code.
A. PRE-EXISTING DEPARTURES FROM TRADITIONAL SHARI'A
The Maldives, like many other Muslim countries, has itself chosen to adopt less than
traditional interpretations of Shari'a, long before this draft penal code project began. Here are
three examples.
Amputation. Traditionally, the Shari'a penalty for theft is the cutting off of a hand or
foot.61 A first offense is punished with amputation of the right hand; a second offense is
punished with amputation of the left foot.62 Jurists disagree as to whether the remaining limbs
should be cut off for subsequent offenses.63 Cutting is only imposed if certain conditions are
met.64

59
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REV . 453 (1997) (summarizing evidence and arguments in support of claim that criminal law's
adherence to community's shared intuitions of justice will increase the criminal law's moral
credibility and, thereby, its crime control effectiveness).
60
By "international norms," we generally mean international human rights norms
embodied in key international treaty law and as articulated by the UN and major international
human rights tribunals.
61
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, 43-44; MUHAMMAD IQBAL SIDDIQI, THE PENAL LAW OF
ISLAM 26-27 (1979); IBRAHIM IBN MUHAMMAD IBN SALIM IBN DUYAN , CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
UNDER HANBALI LAW 89 (George M. Baroody trans., 1958).
62
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, 544; AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § o14.1, 613-14.
63
In the traditional view of the Shafi'i school and others, a third offense would be
punished by cutting off the left hand, and a fourth offense would be punished by cutting off the
right foot. IBN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 544-45; MOHAMED S. EL-AWA , PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC
LAW : A COMPARATIVE STUDY 5 (2000); AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § o14.1, 614.
However, other views hold that the penalty for subsequent thefts should not be amputation, but
rather compensation, IBN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 544-45, and possibly imprisonment as well,
IBN DUYAN , supra note 61, at 102-03.
64
For example, the stolen property must be of a certain value (nisab) and must be taken
from a place of "safe custody" or safekeeping, meaning that it was adequately protected. IBN
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The use of amputation as punishment conflicts with international norms. As perhaps the
most severe form of corporal punishment, its prohibition is subsumed within the broader
international norm against all forms of corporal punishment.65 Current Maldivian penal law66
and the penal codes of many other Muslim countries67 do not authorize the cutting of limbs for
any offense.68 The Draft Code carries forward that position.
Death Penalty for Non-Homicide Offenses. Under Shari'a, death may be imposed as a
penalty for adultery or apostasy,69 although there is some disagreement as to apostasy.70 There

64
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RUSHD , supra note 6, at 537-40. For other conditions, see EL-AWA , supra note 60, at 2-7;
AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § o14.2, 614; IBN DUYAN , supra note 58, at 89-104.
65
See RUDOLF PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW : THEORY AND
PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY -FIRST CENTURY 175-76 (2005) (discussing the
incompatibility of amputation and other forms of corporal punishment with various international
treaties); Jacqueline M. Young, Torture And Inhumane Punishment Of United States Citizens In
Saudi Arabia And The United States Government's Failure To Act, 16 HASTINGS INT 'L & COMP.
L. REV . 663 (1993) (“[B]oth amputations and floggings are forms of cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishment, and are thus prohibited under international law.”); Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights, 53d sess., Item 8(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7
(1997) (“Corporal punishment is inconsistent with the prohibition of torture and other cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment enshrined, inter alia, in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”).
66
See Maldives Penal Code §§ 131-149 (authorizing imprisonment, exile, house
detention, and restitution, but not amputation, as a punishment for various forms of theft).
67
See, e.g., Penal Code §§ 379-382 (Malay.) (authorizing imprisonment, fines, and
whipping, but not amputation, as punishment for theft); see also Sam S. Souryal et al., The
Penalty of Hand Amputation for Theft in Islamic Justice, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE :
TRADITIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL SYSTEMS OF LAW AND CONTROL 397, 418 n.3 (Charles B.
Fields & Richter H. Moore, Jr. eds., 2d ed., 2005) (identifying only five of more than fifty
Muslim-majority nations that apply this penalty). But see Kent Benedict Gravelle, Islamic Law
in Sudan: a Comparative Analysis, 5 ILSA J. INT 'L & COMP. L. 1, 11 (1998) (“[A]lthough most
Muslim states do not amputate limbs for theft, the list of states/areas that use the punishment is
growing.”).
68
See Draft Maldivian Penal Code [hereinafter DMPC] § 1005 (Punishment Method
Equivalency Table); DMPC § 1202 (Application of Alternative Punishments); DMPC § 92
(Authorized Terms of Imprisonment); DMPC ch. 210 (Theft Offenses). These provisions
authorize imprisonment, fines, and certain alternative punishments, but not amputation, as a
penalty for theft.
69
One of the traditional hudud punishments for a married person who commits adultery
(continued...)
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also is some disagreement over whether a woman can be executed for apostasy and whether the
apostate must be given a chance to repent (and thereby avoid execution).71
Use of the death penalty in such situations conflicts with international norms. For
example, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “[i]n
countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes . . . .”72 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has stated its view that
imposing the death penalty for unlawful sexual intercourse and apostasy violates this provision
because these offenses do not constitute the most serious crimes.73 Instead, use of this ultimate
punishment should be limited to "intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave
consequences."74
Current Maldivian law does not impose the death penalty for adultery or apostasy.75
Likewise, under the Draft Code, the death penalty is available only for purposeful killing.76
Retaliation for Assault. Under Shari'a, assault is punishable with a retaliatory wound of
equal nature (qisas) (or with the payment of blood money (diya)).77 Such retaliatory wounding is
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(...continued)
(zina) is stoning to death. IBN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 523; AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6,
at § o12.2, 610; SIDDIQI, supra note 58, at 51. The traditional hadd punishment for apostasy
(renouncing or abandoning Islam, known as ridda) is generally considered to be death. IBN
RUSHD , supra note 6, at 552; AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § o68.1, 595; SIDDIQI, supra
note 58, at 51, 109.
70
For instance, Mohamed El-Awa argues that the relevant Qur'anic passages are not
specifying a penalty for apostasy. He suggests that jurists began to support the death penalty as a
punishment for apostasy for deterrent purposes. EL-AWA , supra note 58, at 50-53. Although a
portion of the Shafi'i school holds this view, most schools view the death penalty as the hadd
punishment for apostasy. Id.
71
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 552.
72
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1955 (entry into force Mar. 23, 1976), art. 6(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
73
See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sudan, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.85, para. 8 (Nov. 19, 1997).
74
Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty,
E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1984).
75
The only offenses punishable by death under the current Maldivian Penal Code are
"caus[ing] hurt to the life of the President in contravention of Law or Shar'ah," § 36, and treason,
§ 37.
76
See DMPC § 92 (Authorized Terms of Imprisonment), specifically subsection (k)
(Death Penalty Available Only for Most Egregious Form of Killing). DMPC § 1204 (Death
Penalty) further limits the imposition of the death penalty by adding proof/evidentiary
requirements.
77
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 490; SIDDIQI, supra note 58, at 52.
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inconsistent with international norms.78 Current Maldivian law and the law of many Islamic
countries79 do not authorize retaliatory wounding as a punishment for assault,80 a position
followed in the Draft Code.
B. SEEKING ACCOMMODATIONS
During the drafting process, a number of devices were employed to ease the tensions
between Shari'a and international norms. The choice of what accommodation approach would be
used, if any, was, of course, a determination that only the Maldivians could make and a matter on
which there existed political and legal limitations.81 Here are some examples of different
approaches to accommodation:
1. Finding Principled Common Ground: Use of the Death Penalty
An attractive method of accommodation is to find principled common ground between
Shari'a and international norms. The death penalty is a traditional form of hadd punishment for
adultery, apostasy, and murder. Under certain circumstances, Shari'a makes death a mandatory
punishment for these offenses. Many have argued that the use of the death penalty for any
offense violates international norms.82
As noted previously, the Maldivians and many other Muslim countries formally have
dropped it as a penalty for adultery and apostasy.83 It remains on the books as an authorized
punishment (for assassination of the President or injuring the sovereignty or territorial integrity

78

Assault as a punishment conflicts with the well-established international norm against
state-ordered corporal punishment. See supra note 62.
79
See Maldivian Penal Code § 126-130 (authorizing imprisonment, exile, fines, and (in
some circumstances) the payment of blood money, but not retaliatory wounding, as punishments
for assault); see, e.g., Penal Code §§ 319-338 (Malay.) (authorizing imprisonment, fines, and
lashes, but not retaliation, as punishment for assault).
80
Assault offenses (Chapter 120) are subject to the normal grading scheme set forth in
Chapter 90 of the DMPC. Retaliatory wounding is not one of the punishments permitted under §
92 (Authorized Terms of Imprisonment), DMPC § 93 (Authorized Fines), DMPC § 1005
(Punishment Method Equivalency Table), or DMPC § 1202 (Application of Alternative
Punishments).
81
For example, the Maldivian Constitution requires that the Maldives be "based on the
principles of Islam," MALDIVES CONST . 1, and that "nothing shall be done in violation of Shari'a
or the Constitution," MALDIVES CONST . 43.
82
See Amnesty International, International Standards on the Death Penalty,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT500012006?open&of=ENG-392.
83
See supra text accompanying note 75.
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of the Maldives84) but has not been used in the Maldives for more than fifty years, earning the
country the categorization of "de facto abolition" by Amnesty International.85
The Draft Code’s approach is to keep the penalty legally available but under principled
rules that make its application essentially impossible. Draft Code Section 92(a) authorizes the
death penalty for Class A felonies (murder), but Section 92(k) limits its use to “the most
egregious imaginable form of a purposeful killing of another person in the most cruel and
heinous manner.”86 Other provisions impose additional limitations on its use.87 What is
particularly attractive about this resolution is its conceptual legitimacy. That is, there is broad
agreement that more serious violations ought to be punished more severely than less serious
violations.88 If the death penalty holds the unique position as being the most serious sanction
possible, it logically should be reserved for the most serious case. If one can imagine a more
serious case than the one at hand, then the death penalty is not legally authorized.
2. Making Punishment Only Symbolic: Lashing as a Penalty
Another approach that often found some means of accommodation was to retain a formal
rule but to remove its troubling effects. One example of this approach is seen in the treatment of
flogging or lashes, a traditional form of hudud punishments. The Qur'an authorizes flogging as
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See Maldivian Penal Code §§ 36, 37.
85
See Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries: Abolitionist in
Practice (May 15, 2006), http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-abolitionist3-eng
86
The final report of the Maldivian codification project marks as an issue for discussion
by the Majlis (the Maldivian parliament) whether the death penalty should be removed from the
Penal Code altogether. See 1 Final Report of the Maldivian Penal Law & Sentencing
Codification Project 63 n.4 (Jan. 2006).
87
DMPC § 1204 (Death Penalty) of the sentencing guidelines further limits the
imposition of the death penalty. DMPC § 1204(a) requires that the government prove to a
practical certainty not only the elements of the offense but also that "the offense committed is
worse and represents more culpable behavior than any other offense imaginable." DMPC §
1204(b) limits imposition of the death penalty on the basis of a defendant's confession (defendant
must have advice of counsel, testify freely in open court, and confess to every element). DMPC
§ 1204(c) imposes evidentiary requirements (witnesses must be evaluated to establish capacity &
competence, contradicted testimony cannot be used to satisfy the proof requirements in
subsection (a)). DMPC § 1204(d) provides for an automatic appeal for complete review of all
findings of fact and law.
88
See, e.g., ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at § 3 (discussing punishment
theory and noting the relevance of the seriousness of the violation).
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punishment for a variety of hudud offenses,.89 and Islamic jurists also consider it to be one of the
forms of discretionary (ta’zir) punishment.90
Such punishments are generally seen as in conflict with international norms. The U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”91 Lashes are generally held to be
degrading treatment based on the United Nations Convention Against Torture and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.92
The Draft Code retains the sanction of lashes, but converts it to a primarily symbolic form
of punishment. Draft Code Section 411(d)(2) defines lashes as “the symbolic punishment of
striking an offender’s back with a short length of rope in a manner not designed to cause bodily
injury” and requires that a single person use the rope by moving only his wrist.93

89

For example, the hadd punishment for the offense of zina (unlawful intercourse,
encompassing both adultery and fornication) committed by unmarried persons is the
administrations 100 lashes. IBN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 524. The hadd punishment for the
offense of qadhf (false accusations of unlawful intercourse) is administration of 80 lashes. Id. at
531. The traditional hadd punishment for drinking intoxicating beverages is generally
considered to be 40 lashes, at least in the Shafi'i school, although some views hold it to be 80
lashes, while others say 20 lashes. Id. at 535; SIDDIQI, supra note 58, at 116-18.
90
See SIDDIQI, supra note 61, at 172-75; AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at 619.
91
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. G.A. Res.
217; see also ICCPR art. 7.
92
See, e.g., Jennifer Tyus, Note, Going Too Far: Extending Shari'a Law in Nigeria from
Personal to Public Law, 3 WASH . U. GLOBAL STUD . L. REV . 199, 212-13 (2004) (noting that
punishments such as flogging "are considered 'cruel, inhumane, and degrading'" and therefore
conflict with international human rights standards and the United Nations Convention Against
Torture); Pavani Thagirisa, Note, A Historical Perspective of the Shari'a Project & A
Cross-Cultural and Self-Determination Approach to Resolving the Shari'a Project in Nigeria, 29
BROOK. J. INT 'L L. 459, 496 (2003) (noting that flogging violates the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights' prohibition of torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment);
Richard Lillich, The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency,
79 AM . J. INT 'L L. 1072, 1078 (1985) (including flogging as a form of cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishment).
93
As a note to the proposed text explains:
This definition of lashes seeks to capture the practice of punishing hudud offenses with
lashes as currently performed in the Maldives in accordance with Islamic law. The high
level of detail [in the definition of 'lashes'] indicates the vital importance of the practice
remaining in this form in order to comply with international norms regarding the humane
punishment of offenders.
DMPC § 411 n.12. Lashes are not a part of the general grading scheme in Chapter 90, but
instead are authorized (in specified amounts) only as additional punishment for specific offenses:
DMPC § 411(c)(5) authorizes 100 lashes for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse; DMPC § 413(b)(3)
(continued...)
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3. Limiting Scope and Reducing Penalties
Another approach, which tends to minimize but not eliminate the practical effect of a
conflict between Shari'a and international norms, is to seriously limit the scope of the traditional
Shari'a offense and to reduce the penalties that follow from its violation. Two examples:
Criminalizing Criticizing Islam. Shari'a criminalizes apostasy (ridda) -- voluntarily
renouncing one’s faith. According to traditional views, a broad variety of conduct can be
considered acts entailing apostasy.94 Traditionally, "things that entail apostasy from Islam,"
include dozens of acts, such as "describ[ing] a Muslim or someone who wants to become a
Muslim in terms of unbelief," and being "sarcastic about any ruling of the Sacred Law;" indeed,
"the subject is nearly limitless."95
An offense that covers this broad range of acts likely violates international norms of
freedom of religion and freedom of expression.96 In addition, when punishable by death,
criminalizing apostasy conflicts with international norms against the use of capital punishment.97
The Draft Code’s approach is to recognize an offense, but to significantly minimize its
reach and effect. The Draft Code does not criminalize converting from Islam,98 but does include
a provision that prohibits criticizing the fundamentals of Islam (Section 617. Criticizing Islam).
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(...continued)
authorizes 19 lashes for Incest; DMPC § 612(b)(2) authorizes 80 lashes for False Accusation of
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse; DMPC § 616(b)(2) authorizes 40 lashes for a violation of §
616(a)(2)(B), which is public consumption of alcohol away from a place licensed to sell it.
94
For a discussion of apostasy and acts which constitute apostasy, see AL-MISRI,
RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § o8.7.
95
Id. at § o8.7, 596-98.
96
See, e.g., U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 18 (“everyone has the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”); ICCPR, supra
note 69, at art. 18.1 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice . . .
.”); PETERS, supra note 65, at 179; ANN ELIZABETH MAYER , ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
TRADITION AND POLITICS 163-64 (1991). Cf. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 12, Sept. 19, 1981 (“(a) Every person has the right to express his thoughts and beliefs
so long as he remains within the limits prescribed by the Law. No one, however, is entitled to
disseminate falsehood or to circulate reports which may outrage public decency, or to indulge in
slander, innuendo or to cast defamatory aspersions on other persons. . . . (e) No one shall hold in
contempt or ridicule the religious beliefs of others or incite public hostility against them; respect
for the religious feelings of others is obligatory on all Muslims.”).
97
See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
98
There are no provisions criminalizing the abandonment of one's faith in the DMPC
(see particularly Chapter 610 (Public Order and Safety Offenses)).
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While acknowledging the need to avoid publicly insulting Islam, Section 617 substantially
narrows the reach of the offense. First, Subsection (a) limits it to being “critical of [those]
fundamentals of Islam as set out in the Constitution.”99 This limits the prohibition to only that
speech or those materials that insult the core tenets of Islam, which are understood to be the
oneness of God, acceptance of Muhammad as His prophet, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and
charity.100 Second, the offense is defined to require public speech or distribution of materials.
Third, the offense has a demanding culpability requirement: it must be shown that the defendant
had the purpose to insult Islam. That is, it is not enough for liability that one knows one's words
would be taken as insulting, but that it must have been one's purpose. Subsection (b) also
provides an exception for conduct performed on behalf of the government or a scholarly
institution or by an individual for scientific or religious study. Finally, even where the offense is
committed, it is classed only as quasi-criminal, a "violation" rather than an offense (less serious
than the lowest misdemeanor), for which no imprisonment is authorized.101
Criminalizing the Drinking of Alcohol, the Eating of Pork, or the Failure to Fast.
Shari'a prohibits the drinking of intoxicating beverages.102 The traditional punishment for
drinking intoxicating beverages is generally considered to be 40 lashes, at least in the Shafi'i
school, although some views hold that the traditional punishment for this offense is 80 lashes,
while some say 20 lashes. The modern view is that lesser punishments may be appropriate.103
Consuming pork also is criminalized according to the Qur'an and Hadith.104 Similarly, legal
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The Maldivian Constitution defines the tenets of Islam as the "faith, belief and
doctrines of Islam." MALDIVES CONST ., art. 156.
100
See Caesar Farah, Islam: Beliefs and Observances 135-150 (2003) (describing the
basic tenets of Islam); see also DMPC § 617 cmt.
101
Section 617(c) grades the offense as a "violation." Under Section 91(j), violations are
not crimes and do not carry the collateral consequences of criminal conviction; under Section
92(i), neither imprisonment nor banishment are authorized as punishment for a violation.
102
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 534-35.
103
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 535; see also SIDDIQI, supra note 61, at 116-18. El-Awa
argues that the modern view is that ta'zir punishments are appropriate instead of hadd
punishments and that the offense exists to protect the social order rather than being a hadd
offense. See EL-AWA , supra note 63, at 61-63 (citing the Kuwaiti penal code as an example of
applying ta'zir punishment for this offense).
104
See, e.g., The Qur'an, verse 5:3 ("Forbidden unto you are carrion and blood and
swine-flesh . . . ."); AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § p30.2, 673 ("Whoever
premeditatedly eats [unslaughtered meat, blood outpoured, or the flesh of swine] when not forced
by necessity is a criminal"); id. § w52.1(177) (including consuming filth, such as pork, as an
enormity, or sin). The requirement of fasting during Ramadan is also carried forward in the
DMPC. Fasting during Ramadan is obligatory under certain circumstances. See AL-MISRI,
RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § i1.1, 278-79. For more on fasting, see id. § i1.1-1.33; IBN RUSHD ,
supra note 6, at ch. 10.1.
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jurists have found it to be an “enormity” for a Muslim not to fast in the month of Ramadan.105
Some, although not all, classical Shari’a jurists explicitly prohibit the public consumption of pork
and alcohol by non-Muslims as well.106
The punishment for drinking alcoholic beverages, flogging, is in conflict with
international norms against corporal punishment, as noted above.107 To the extent that
prohibitions on not fasting during Ramadan and the consumption of pork and alcohol apply to
private conduct, they also would seem to conflict with international norms regarding privacy.108
And to the extent that these prohibitions would be enforced as a criminalization of a failure to
practice Islam, then they would violate international norms guaranteeing freedom of religion.109
The Draft Code carries forward the existing Maldivian offenses as Section 616 (Failing to
Fast During Ramadan; Consuming Pork or Alcohol). The Draft Code offenses are set at the
lowest category, Class 3 misdemeanors (and an additional punishment of 40 lashes is authorized
– recall that this is largely symbolic punishment under the Draft Code).110 More importantly, the
offenses are limited in scope. They apply only to Muslims; non-Muslims may consume in
licensed areas or in private. Even Muslims are exempt from private failures to fast.111 The lack
of public consumption reaffirms the society's preference for adherence to Islamic scripture but

105

A L-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at 975. Under the Ottoman Criminal Code, eating
publicly during the fast in the month of Ramadan was considered a criminal offense. PETERS,
supra note 65, at 95.
106
A L-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at 608.
107
See supra note 62.
108
See ICCPR, supra note 69, at art 17 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . .”); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 94, art 12 (using almost identical text as the ICCPR);
see also infra note 128 (on international privacy rights); cf. infra note 109 (on Shari'a's
recognition of privacy interests). But see Andrew R. Dennington, We Are the World? Justifying
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Contemporary Foreign Legal Practice in Atkins, Lawrence,
and Roper, 29 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 269, 291 n.164 (2006) (“Privacy rights do not yet
enjoy nearly enough recognition, particularly in non-Western courts, to be considered customary
international norms, but some privacy rights may achieve that status in the foreseeable future.”).
109
See ICCPR, supra note 69, at art 18 (“(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
(2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”).
110
See supra note 93.
111
However, Section 616(a)(1)(B) does continue to criminalize the private consumption
of pork or alcohol by Muslims.
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the exclusion of private consumption reduces the intrusion on personal autonomy. Shari'a's
recognition of privacy interests supports this limitation.112
4. Replacing a Shari'a Rule with an Evidentiary Rebuttable Presumption:
Marriage Presuming Consent to Intercourse
Another useful technique for narrowing a gap between Shari'a and international norms is
to drop the traditional Shari'a rule or offense but to carry forward the values underlying it in an
evidentiary rebuttable presumption. For example, consider the traditional Shari'a view that a
woman, by marrying, consents to sexual intercourse with her spouse and vice versa. A husband
is then free to engage in sexual intercourse with his wife as he chooses as long as he does not
physically harm her,113 and a wife is obligated to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband
unless it would cause her harm.114
The failure to criminalize unwanted sexual intercourse likely conflicts with international
norms respecting the equality and dignity of all individuals. Requiring a woman to consent to
sexual intercourse because she is married detracts from “the inherent dignity and . . . the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” as outlined in the preamble to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.115
The Draft Code does not follow the traditional Shari'a principle but neither does it ignore
the spirit behind it. Section 131(a) (Sexual Assault) criminalizes engaging in sexual intercourse
without consent. Next Section 131(b) allows the trier of fact to presume the existence of consent
if the person engages in sexual intercourse with his spouse, but the presumption is rebuttable. In
other words, the husband does not at law have a right to unconsented intercourse; lack of consent
by the wife makes intercourse criminal. But the existence of the rebuttable presumption
recognizes the fact that in a marriage there commonly is an implicit consent to sexual
intercourse, albeit one that may be withdrawn. The useful point here is that the relatively modest
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Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam 58-63 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) (citing various classical authorities affirming this privacy interest including Ibn
Taymiyya, Ibn Hanbal. Al-Mawardi, Said al-Musayyab and Ibn al-Rabi’).
113
A L-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § m5.4, 526 ("A husband possesses full right to
enjoy his wife's person ([although sodomy] is absolutely unlawful) in what does not physically
harm her.").
114
Id. at § m5.1, 525 ("It is obligatory for a woman to let her husband have sex with her
immediately when . . . he asks her . . . at home . . . and she can physically endure it.").
115
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. G.A.
Res. 217. See also Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Feb. 23, 1994); Lisa Hajjar, Religion,
State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A Framework For Comparative
Analysis, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 11-12 (2004)
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and common sense rebuttable presumption can stand-in as a somewhat milder form of, but
nonetheless a continuing symbol for, the Shari'a rule.116
5. Preserving Symbolic Value by Retaining Offenses of No Effect: Authorizing
Polygamy
In some instances, a gap between traditional Shari'a and international norms may be
ignored if it is clear that the Shari'a rule has no practical effect, as where existing social norms
have already closed the gap. For example, Shari'a authorizes a man to have up to four wives.117
A woman may not have more than one husband.118
The international norm against polygamy is embodied in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which includes an
article on equality in marriage; polygamy would violate that equality.119 According to a General
Comment of the CEDAW Committee:
Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman's right to equality with men, and can have
such serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependents that such
marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited. The Committee notes with concern
that some States parties, whose constitutions guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous
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The final report of the Maldivian codification project discusses changing this
rebuttable presumption to an absolute presumption or removing the presumption altogether. See
Final Report, supra note 86, at 70 n.7.
117
I BN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 47 (The Muslim jurists agreed about the permissibility of
(a man) marrying four women at the same time. . . .); AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at §
m6.10, 530 ("It is unlawful for a free man to marry more than four women.").
118
A L-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at 516.
119
See CEDAW, supra note 114, at art. 16(1) (“(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and
full consent; (c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution”).
The CEDAW Committee has condemned polygamy as a violation of human rights in many of its
reports and concluding observations on States own reports. See e.g., Burkina Faso, 31/01/2000,
U.N . Doc . A/55/38, paras. 281–282; Cameroon, 26/06/2000, U.N . Doc. A/55/38, para. 54;
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 01/02/2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/38, paras. 215–216; Egypt,
02/02/2001, U.N . Doc. A/56/38, paras. 352–353; Guinea, 31/07/2001, U.N . Doc. A/56/38,
paras. 122–123; Indonesia, 14/05/98, U.N. Doc. A/53/38, para. 284( a) ; Iraq, 14/06/2000, U.N.
Doc. A/55/38, para. 191; Israel, 12/08/97, U.N. Doc. A/52/38 Rev.1, Part II, para. 163; Jordan,
27/01/2000, U.N . Doc. A/55/38, para. 174–175; Namibia, 12/08/97, U.N. Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1,
Part II, para. 110; Nepal, 01/07/99, U.N. Doc. A/54/38, para. 153; Nigeria, 07/07/98, U.N. Doc.
A/53/38/Rev.1, para. 153; Senegal, 12/04/94, U.N. Doc. A/49/38, para. 721; United Republic of
Tanzania, 06/07/98, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1, para. 229; Uzbekistan, 02/02/2001, U.N. Doc .
A/56/38, paras. 187–188.
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marriage in accordance with personal or customary law. This violates the constitutional
rights of women, and breaches the provisions of article 5(a) of the Convention.120
The Human Rights Committee (created by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights) has condemned polygamy in a number of its concluding observations.121 In its General
Comments, the Human Rights Committee has observed:
It should also be noted that equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry implies
that polygamy is incompatible with this principle. Polygamy violates the dignity of
women. It is an inadmissible discrimination against women. Consequently, it should be
definitely abolished wherever it continues to exist.122
The Committee on the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
similarly has condemned Polygamy.123
The Draft Code carries forward the traditional rule. Section 410(a) (Unlawful Marriage
by a Man) allows a man to marry up to four wives (with the consent of current wives and the
court). Section 410(b) (Unlawful Marriage by a Woman) prohibits a woman from marrying
again once she is already married. But, in fact, the standard practice in the Maldives and in many
Muslim countries is for men to marry only one woman.124 Because there exists in the Maldives a
strong social aversion to polygamy, the absence of a formal legal prohibition is likely to have
little or no effect.125 In other words, the situation is similar to some of the accommodations
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General Recommendation 21, Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, UN CEDAW OR,
13th Sess., UN Doc. A/47/38, (1994) at para. 14.
121

See, e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo, 27/03/2000, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.118, para. 11; Gabon, 10/11/2000, U.N . Doc. CCPR/CO /70/G AB, para. 9;
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 06/11/98, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.101, para. 17; Nigeria, 24/07/96,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65, A /51/40, para. 291; Senegal, 19/11/97, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add 82, para. 12.
122
General Comment No. 28: Equality of rights between men and women (article 3), UN
HRCOR, 68th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000) at para. 24.
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See e.g., Cameroon, 08/12/99, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/A dd.40, paras. 14, 33;
Kyrgyzstan, 01/09/2000, U.N. Doc . E/C.12/1/Add.49, paras. 16, 30; Nepal, 24/09/2001, U.N.
Doc . E/C.12/1/Add.66, paras. 10, 13; Nigeria, 13/05/98, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/Add.23, para. 22;
Senegal, 24/09/2001, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.62, paras. 15, 39.
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See Heather Johnson, There are Worse Things Than Being Alone: Polygamy in Islam,
Past, Present, and Future, 11 WM . & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563, 591 (2005) (noting that
polygamy is "already a very rare practice and will fall out of use" and that many Islamic countries
have already abolished or limited polygamy); Rabia Mills, Polygamy,
http://muslim-canada.org/polygamy.pdf ("Polygamy is not practiced much in the Muslim world
today").
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discussed in the previous section: the formal legal rule tracks Shari'a while the actual practice is
consistent with international norms. (In fact, some jurists have interpreted Shari'a as expressing a
preference for one wife. For instance, Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri states that “it is fitter to
confine oneself to just one (wife)."126)
6. Retaining Symbolic Offenses with the Expectation of Non-Prosecution:
Criminalizing Fornication, Adultery, and Same-Sex Intercourse
One last approach was to ignore a gap between Shari'a and international norms where the
Shari'a-prohibited conduct did sometimes occur but generally was not prosecuted. For example,
because sexual intercourse is lawful under Shari'a only between a husband and wife, both
adultery and fornication are prohibited, as zina,127 which can be punishable by death if the
offender is married, and with lashes when the offender is unmarried.128 Because persons of the
same sex may not marry, same-sex intercourse is necessarily included in the prohibition.129
Many human rights instruments stress rights to privacy in family and personal life, which
would likely conflict with the criminalization of fornication, adultery, and safe-sex intercourse.130
The Draft Code carries forward the criminalization, albeit with reduced penalties.
Section 411(a) prohibits “sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex other than with a
person to whom he is married.” Instead of death or flogging, Subsection (c)(1) sets the
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http://www.cpamedia.com/history/maldive_thousand_islands, (noting that "[p]olygamy is rare"
in the Maldives).
126
See AL-MISRI, RELIANCE , supra note 6, at § m6.10
127
See IBN RUSHD , supra note 6, at 521 (defining the offense of zina as "all sexual
intercourse that occurs outside of a valid marriage").
128
See id. at 521, 523.
129
For treatment of same-sex relations in the Qur'an, see verses 2:188, 49:13, 53:45,
11:78, and 24:32. While jurists agreed that same-sex intercourse was forbidden, they differed on
the doctrinal basis for its disapproval.
130
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 69, at art. 17(1) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.”); see also European Convention on Human Rights, art
8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.”); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A)
(1998) (striking down Ireland’s anti-sodomy statute as a violation of the privacy rights in the
European Convention on Human Rights); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. The United Kingdom, 29
Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (1999) (finding that the discharge of homosexuals from the military violates
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights); Toonen v. Australia, Communication
No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (finding, by the UN Human Rights
Committee, that the non-discrimination requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights also apply to sexual orientation and, hence, laws prohibiting sodomy are
impermissible).
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punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse between two unmarried persons as that of a Class 2
misdemeanor,131 which has a maximum authorized term of imprisonment of six months;132 the
maximum authorized fine is 12,500 MVR,133 which is equivalent to approximately $1,060.
Section 411(c)(2) punishes same-sex intercourse as a Class 1 misdemeanor, which has a
maximum term of imprisonment of one year,134 and a fine not to exceed 25,000 MVR,135 which is
equivalent to approximately $2,120.
But even these reduced penalties are not likely to be imposed because the offense
generally is not prosecuted. However, this approach to dealing with conflicts between Shari'a
and international norms is noticeably different from that discussed above. Ignoring a Shari'a
prohibition that is not prosecuted is considerably more problematic than ignoring a Shari'a rule
that has no effect because such conduct does not occur (as with polygamy). Keeping the offense
upon an expectation of no prosecution leaves an unhealthy discretion in the government to
prosecute the odd case, with no limitation on how that discretion might be exercised.
C. CONCLUSION
Here then are six ways of dealing with conflicts between traditional Shari'a and
international norms. Where they do not avoid the conflict, they commonly dramatically reduce
its practical effect. In some instances, the formal Shari’a rule conflicts with international norms
while the practical reality is consistent with them.
One may wonder why the Maldivians do not simply drop a legal rule that conflicts with
international norms if they are comfortable with an actual practice that does not conflict. For
instance, one may wonder why the Maldivians do not completely remove the death penalty, given
its "de facto abolition," or why they do not criminalize polygamy. Why not get "full credit," as it
were, with the international community for practices that would be welcomed and approved?
The probably obvious answer is that there is more to the political and social situation in
the Maldives, and other Muslim countries, than pleasing the international community. Muslims
cherish their religion and its practice. To the extent that they have in some ways moved closer to
international norms, it is commonly because their own social judgments have changed. In such a
situation, it is no surprise that they would wish to honor traditional Islamic practices even as their
society has altered how those practices are interpreted. Muslims have little reason to rush to
change the legal formalities if those formalities show deference to a religion they cherish.
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Section 411(c)(1) grades the offense differently depending on the marital status of the
parties involved.
132
See DMPC § 92(g).
133
See DMPC § 93(b)(7).
134
See DMPC § 92(f).
135
See DMPC § 93(b)(6).
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IV. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CODE
The single most significant improvement to criminal law in the Maldives would be the
adoption of a comprehensive penal code, one that provides in written form all of the rules that
would be needed for adjudication of a criminal case.136 The benefits of comprehensive
codification are well known:137 providing fair notice of what the penal law commands and fair
adjudication of each purported violation.138 In the criminal law's ex ante role, codification
improves fair notice by abolishing or codifying unwritten crimes and by clarifying offense
definitions. It also affirms one of the “bedrock principles of criminal law . . . that legislatures,
not courts, should be the primary definers of crimes.”139 Through codification, the legislature
exercises its authority over criminal law and avoids de facto delegation to the judiciary to create
or define crimes. In the criminal law's ex post role, codification facilitates fair adjudication by
increasing uniformity in application, by eliminating inconsistent and overlapping offense
definitions, and by reducing the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.
The current Maldivian penal "code" is, in fact, not a code at all. The penal law is
incomplete, scattered, and, where it does exist, is often technical and legalistic, a common feature
of older codes. Some proscriptions are defined outside the penal code,140 and other crimes are
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For a discussion of the dramatic effect of codification in the context of Islamic law,
see Layish, supra note 33 (noting the resulting shift of authority from Islamic jurists to an often
secular legislature).
137
See generally ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at § 3 (1997); Ronald L.
Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code Reform, 1 CRIM . L.F. 99
(1989); Frank J. Remington, Criminal Law Revision Codification vs. Piecemeal Amendment, 33
NEB. L. REV . 396 (1954); Albert J. Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code, 85 U. PA . L. REV . 549
(1937); Note, We Need a Criminal Code, 7 AM . L. REV . 264 (1873).
138
See ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at § 2.2; Robinson, Fair Notice and
Fair Adjudication, supra note 31, at 337. Although fair notice and fair adjudication originated as
Western ideas, they are arguably as relevant, is not more so, to an Islamic democracy such as the
Maldives.
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William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH . L. REV . 505,
576 (2001) ("The usual reason given is that judicial crime creation carries too big a risk of
nonmajoritarian crimes, which in turn creates too much of a risk that ordinary people won't know
what behavior can get them into trouble."); see also Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution,
and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH . L. REV . 1269, 1294 (1998) ("Criminal law choices are
controvertible, fundamentally political, and thus best left to the political departments.").
140
For example, the Maldives previously criminalized sexual assault in a separate statute.
See (Maldives) Book 6, § 173(10) and (12). (Sexual assault is Chapter 130 in the DMPC.) On
this point, American codes did better than current Maldivian law. See Paul H. Robinson et al.,
The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW . U. L. REV . 1, 50-51 (2000)
(faulting numerous American codes for failing to comprehensively codify excuse and
justification defenses, recognizing by implication that these codes otherwise reached the most
(continued...)
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subject to creation without legislative action. For example, under the current regime, the
President may create penal offenses, which has occurred under Section 88141 and the Law on
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.142 Most problematic is the reliance upon offenses
that are written nowhere in Maldivian law, either legislation or regulations, but only derived ad
hoc from the principles of Shari'a. This means that people, other than possibly Shari'a scholars,
cannot know beforehand what rule will be applied in a case. Indeed, given the significant
differences in the interpretation of Shari'a, often even scholars cannot know.
These difficulties with current Maldivian law are typical of the problems found in many
countries, including many Western countries, without comprehensive codifications. But the
unique culture, geography, and demographics of the Maldives make these statutory weaknesses
even more problematic. There is a greater need for a comprehensive penal code in the Maldives
than in many other countries because the country has a history of an overreaching executive that
was not hesitant to take over criminal lawmaking authority; because its island structure means
that there is greater need for a code that can be understood and applied uniformly by
geographically distant officials who have limited legal training; and because historically the
judiciary has been less than independent, raising fears that the adjudication of individual cases is
influenced by improper factors.143
At the same time, providing a comprehensive penal code to the Maldives is a task
considerably more difficult than it would be for most Western countries, for that project
essentially requires a codification for the first time of certain principles of Shari'a.
V. THE NEED FOR AN ACCESSIBLE CODE:
PLAIN LANGUAGE AND STANDARDIZED DRAFTING FORMS
The benefits of codification are available only if the code's rules are drafted in a way that
can be easily understood and applied. This is not always easy to do.144 The existing Maldivian
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common forms of criminal conduct).
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See, e.g., Maldives Penal Code, § 88 (giving the President the power to make
substantive criminal law).
142
See (Maldives) Law on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act No: 17/77
(1977) (defining the offenses found in Chapter 720 of the DMPC).
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See supra Part I.
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It is an unmet challenge for the criminal codes of many American states. See Paul H.
Robinson et al., The Five Worst, supra note 128, at 24-63 (providing examples of the failure of
many state criminal codes to clearly articulate rules of conduct).
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“code’s” failure manifests itself in such things as a highly verbose and technical drafting style,145
poor organization,146 and the presence of overlapping offenses.147
But the task of an accessible penal law is all the more important for the Maldives due to
the political reasons described above, as well as because of its heavy reliance upon the Shari'a.
As noted earlier, in contrast to Western secular law, Shari'a is considered a sacred set of
principles that guides every aspect of daily life.148 Accordingly, any criminal code that makes the
ambitious claim of “being” Shari'a-compliant must be both complete and accessible. Further, as
noted above, accessibility of the penal law is particularly important in the Maldives because, as a
nation of small islands where communication and transportation are limited, criminal
proceedings commonly are conducted by local officials who lack the legal education and sense of
judicial independence found in many other nations. Thus, any set of adjudication principles must
be accessible to judges with limited training, yet still be complete and sufficiently detailed.
Two key aspects of the draft penal code that increase its accessibility are its organization
and the drafting style of its provisions. Most importantly, this means the use of a structure that
distinguishes the "general part" from the "special part" of a code and the use of plain language
drafting and standardized drafting forms.
A. The General Part/Special Part Distinction
The overall layout of a code can contribute to its effectiveness. A useful convention
drawn from modern codification work is to draft the substantive code in two parts, one
containing the definitions of all specific offenses (the "Special Part") and the other containing all
145

See, e.g., Maldives Penal Code, § 144:
Property in the possession of a person who commits theft, criminal breach of trust,
cheating or extortion in respect of government property shall be forfeited where it is
established that such person has built dwellings or obtained other property or created
other property from money or property obtained through such theft, criminal breach of
trust, cheating or extortion or where such reasons exist that the person has created his
property through property or money obtained from the acts of theft, criminal breach of
trust, cheating or extortion or where he is unable to provide the property that was the
subject matter of the offences of theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating or extortion.
Properties seized in this respect shall be sold and all its proceeds shall be utilized to
regain the property that was the subject of theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating or
extortion. Not regaining property but gaining the value of the property.
However, such poor drafting is not unique to the Maldives. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1
(2004) (defining murder); W. Va. Code § 61-1-8 (2004) (defining the offense of "desecration of
flag").
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Compare current Maldivian law, table of contents, with DMPC, table of contents.
Like Massachusetts' penal code, current Maldivian law lists offenses by category, but does not
organize offenses within these categories in any discernable way. See Paul H. Robinson et al.,
The Five Worst, supra note 128, at 35.
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See infra Part VII.
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J OSEPH SCHACHT , AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964) .
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general principles of liability and other matters (the "General Part"), each of the General Part
provisions having application to each offense in the Special Part.149 This division allows for the
dramatic simplification of offense definitions. By defining general liability rules separately, such
as those governing complicity, culpability requirements, or inchoate offenses, these matters can
be left out of the definitions of specific offenses. Thus, not only are the offense definitions made
more readable but the general principles then apply to all offenses, not just a scattered few.
Culpability levels, for example, are complex concepts involving detailed examination of
the offender’s mental state in relation to the existing circumstances and likely consequences at
the time the offense was conducted.150 A single general set of culpability provisions can avoid
cluttering each offense definition with the definition of the culpability terms used there, and can
allow the single General Part definition to be as detailed and sophisticated a definition of
culpability as needed.151 Other General Part provisions share the same advantages. Doctrines of
imputation, inchoate liability, and general defenses also illustrate the advantages of separating
generally applicable provisions. One can imagine the dramatic loss of verbal economy if each
offense definition included all inchoate versions of the offense. For example, the murder
definition would have to define the completed offense as well as attempted murder, complicity as
to murder, and conspiracy as to murder. The situation would worsen if each offense definition
then included all of the justifications, excuses, and other defenses applicable to that offense
rather than, for example, separately defining a general self-defense provision that could apply to
homicide, assault, and other related offenses. The General Part/Special Part division is not a
novel invention, but rather a device common to all modern criminal codes.152
B. Standardized, Plain Language Drafting
The nature of writing is such that there are many different ways in which one may express
a thought. Differences in how an idea is expressed by different writers may simply reflect
differences in vocabulary and style rather than an intended difference in meaning. But in the
close-reading realm of statutory interpretation, differences between provisions often are taken by
a reader to imply a difference in meaning, even if none is intended. A common principle of
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See MODEL PENAL CODE, tbl. of contents (1962) (denoting "Part I: General
Provisions" and "Part II: Definition of Specific Crimes").
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See, e.g., DMPC § 24(e) (defining the culpability of "recklessness" in terms of a
person grossly deviating from "acceptable standards of conduct" by "conscious[ly]
disregard[ing]" a risk, also "considering nature and purpose of the person' s conduct and the
circumstances known to the person . . .").
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See, e.g., DMPC § 220(a) (defining the offense of criminal property damage simply as
"recklessly and without consent . . . damage[ing] property of another").
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See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, tbl. of contents (1962); Nat't Commission of Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, tbl. of contents (1971); 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE
KENTUCKY PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL, tbl. of contents,
at xiii (2003);1 FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND REFORM
COMMISSION , tbl. of contents, at iii (2003); DMPC, tbl. of contents (2005).
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statutory construction is that “different language implies a different meaning,”153 yet recognizing
a difference may make little sense in some instances.154 Differences in language without
intended differences in meaning can force a judge into the awkward position of either creating an
illogical distinction or violating a basic rule of statutory construction. Even if the problem can be
resolved rationally, it distracts the reader from a quick and clear understanding of the provision.
Unfortunately, it is common in the current Maldivian “code”,155 as it is in many American
156
codes, that slightly different language and structure are used when no real difference is
intended. These non-modern codes also commonly use dense and legalistic language,157 a
practice that similarly frustrates clear and effective rule articulation as well as uniform liability
determination and grading.
Modern criminal codes avoid these problems by defining offenses using standardized
language, in order to minimize confusion and errant interpretation and improve accessibility,
usability, and uniformity. The Draft Code goes a step further and adopts a formal standard
"template" that insures parallel provisions. For example, in the Special Part of the Code, each
offense definition follows the same template:
Section XXX – [Offense Name]
(a) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if: . . . [listing of the elements
of the broadest form of the offense]
(b) Exception. A person does not commit an offense if he . . . [listing the
conditions under which conduct that would otherwise be an offense under subsection (a)
is not meant to be included within the prohibition – this kind of subsection is used only
occasionally]
(c) Grading.
(1) [Name of Suboffense 1]. The offense is a Class X felony if: . . .
[listing of the special conditions under which the offense will be of this highest
grade]
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supra note 49, at §2.3.
For example, it is illogical to assign different culpability levels to "dealing" in stolen
property. See, e.g., infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., supra note 145.
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For example, Florida's stolen property offenses are defined in three separate sections,
and several additional sections define related provisions, such as exemptions and permissive
inferences. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 812.019-.025 (2004) (defining offense involving "dealing" in
stolen property). The language of these sections is not standardized or formulaic. For example,
§ 812.019 requires that the offender "knows or should know" the property was stolen while §
812.025 (the internet form) requires he "knows, or has reasonable cause to believe . . . ."
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A classic example of this can be found in the United States' federal criminal statute for
criminal organizations, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute,
which is notoriously difficult to navigate. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2005) (defining
conduct prohibited under RICO).
R
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(2) [Name of Suboffense 2]. The offense is a Class Y felony if: . . .
[listing of the special conditions under which the offense will be of this next
highest grade, etc.]
(3) [Name of Suboffense 3]. Otherwise the offense is a Class Z
misdemeanor.
(d) Sentencing Factors. The baseline sentence provided in the Guideline Sentence
Table of Section 1002 for any offense under this Section is [aggravated/mitigated] [one]
level if: . . . [listing of the special conditions under which the offense will be aggravated,
or mitigated, on the sentencing guideline grid]
(e) Rebuttable Presumption. The trier of fact shall presume, subject to rebuttal,
that: . . . [defining the conditions under which an element in the offense definition or
grading can be rebuttably presumed – this kind of subsection is used only occasionally]
(f) Definitions.
(1) “XX” means: . . . [defining a term used in this offense that requires
definition, or citation to where the term is already defined elsewhere in the Code]
(2) “YY” means: . . .
A typical definition is found in Section 120, which defines Assault.158 The first
subsection lists every element of the offense, in this case either (1) touching or injuring another
person without his or her consent or (2) putting another person in fear of imminent bodily injury,
again without his or her consent. The next subsection divides assaults into three different grades:
(1) Serious Assault, (2) Injurious Assault, and (3) Simple Assault, listing the requirements of
each form. The next subsection sets out a sentencing factor, assaulting a person who is a resident
or visitor in a home, which is followed in the next subsection by a set of definitions.159

158

DMPC § 120
The provision reads:
Section 120 – Assault
(a) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he, without the consent of another
person:
(1) touches or injures such person, or
(2) puts such person in fear of imminent bodily injury.
(b) Grading.
(1) Serious Assault. The offense is a Class D felony if the person:
(A) causes serious bodily injury, or
(B) commits the offense with a dangerous weapon.
(2) Injurious Assault. The offense is a Class 2 misdemeanor if the person causes
bodily injury.
(3) Simple Assault. Otherwise the offense is a Class 3 misdemeanor.
(c) Sentencing Factor. The baseline sentence provided in the Guideline Sentence Table
of Section 1002 for any offense under this Section is aggravated one level if the victim is
assaulted in a home where he is a resident or guest.
(d) Definitions.
(continued...)
159
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This general format is followed throughout the code; offense elements are always listed
first, followed by provisions such as rebuttable presumptions, grading, sentencing factors, and
definitions. Each subsection is divided into subparagraphs, creating either a checklist or set of
alternatives. Subsections also each include a title, which facilitates navigation within the section.
Finally, special attention is paid to definitions. A term is initially defined in the first section in
which it appears. An alphabetical listing of all defined terms used in a given chapter, along with
references to where they appear, then appears at the chapter’s end,160 and all defined terms are
listed in alphabetical order in a General Part "dictionary."161 A term is defined only once in the
code to avoid the problem of conflicting definitions if a definition is later amended.
VI. THE NEED FOR A COMMUNICATIVE VERDICT SYSTEM
We have already noted the central role that Shari'a plays in a Muslim society reaches
areas untouched by Western law.162 It regulates both secular and religious life by providing a
"framework of reference for all individual and collective behaviours."163 In an Islamic legal
system, then, there exists a special need for clear explanations of legal judgments; for those
judgements not only affect the defendant at hand but, more clearly than in Western societies, play
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(...continued)
(1) “Dangerous weapon” means:
(A) anything readily capable of lethal use and possessed under
circumstances not manifestly appropriate for any lawful use it may have, or
(B) any implement for the infliction of great bodily injury that serves no
common lawful purpose.
(2) “Home” means any structure or vehicle serving as a person’s place of
residence.
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See, e.g., id.
161
See DMPC § 17.
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See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
163
Reed, supra note 48, at 504-05 (quoting BERNARD BOTIVEAU , CONTEMPORARY
REINTERPRETATIONS OF ISLAMIC LAW : THE CASE OF EGYPT , IN ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW :
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES 261, 263 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993)); see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal
Justice System, in ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM , supra note 19, at 3, 12 ("Law in Islam is
that which answers the following query: What should the conduct of man be in his individual
and collective life, in his relationship to God and to others and to himself in a universal
community of mankind for the fulfillment of man's dual purpose: life on earth and life in the
hereafter?") (footnote omitted); cf. id. at 6 ("[U]nlike any other legal-political-social system,
Islam is an integrated concept of life in this world and in the hereafter. It regulates the conduct of
the state and of the individual in all aspects of human concerns . . . .").
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a central role in shaping societal norms. Criminal law adjudications serve to help communicate
and reinforce what behavior is acceptable and what behavior is condemnable.164
But a judgment in a criminal case, especially the judgment of acquittal, may be based
upon any number of different reasons, and different reasons may carry different messages. An
acquittal may mean that a defendant is factually innocent of the offense. Or, it may mean that the
defendant committed the offense but did so for justifiable reasons. In this case, the verdict means
to tell others that they can engage in similar conduct under similar circumstances in the future.
Or, an acquittal may mean that the defendant committed the offense but under conditions that
render him blameless for it, such as the existence of conditions giving rise to an excuse defense
or the lack of culpability. The message that this verdict means to convey is directly the opposite
from the previous: the conduct remains condemnable, and persons in the future should not
engage in such conduct under such circumstances; it is only because of the special excusing
conditions that this defendant will not on this occasion be punished for what is admittedly
condemnable conduct.
Yet, a traditional verdict system, with its general "not guilty" verdict, fails to signal these
important differences when a defendant is acquitted. And this introduces dangerous ambiguity in
the public meaning given to acquittals. An acquittal based upon an excuse may be mistakenly
taken to approve the conduct, which is meant to be condemned. At the same time, an acquittal
based upon a justification may be mistakenly taken to condemn the conduct, which is meant to be
approved. Only a verdict system that distinguishes between the various reasons for acquittal can
satisfy the obligations of the criminal law to use criminal adjudication to establish and reinforce
societal norms.
Such a verdict system was created in the Proposed Maldivian Rules of Criminal
Procedure (PMRCP) by use of special verdicts that would effectively communicate the criminal
law's rules of conduct. The idea to separate verdicts by their functions is not new.165 Most if not
all jurisdictions have a special verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity," which serves the
purposes highlighted here: it allows an acquittal of someone who has violated the criminal law's
rules of conduct without undermining the clarity of its prohibitions, by signaling that the acquittal
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See SIDDIQI, supra note 58, at 9 (describing "the purpose of punishment" as "the
humiliation for the convict and the lesson for the public" (emphasis added)).
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See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94
NW . U. L. REV . 1297, 1327-36 (2000) (advocating that a verdict of innocent be available with an
increased burden of proof to mitigate the social stigma of an unambiguous "not guilty" verdict);
Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST . J. CRIM . L. 289
(2003) (arguing for adoption of a Guilty But Partially Responsible verdict, that is, a "doctrinal
mitigating excuse of partial responsibility that would apply to all crimes, and that would be
determined by the trier of fact"); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE :
WHY THE CRIMINAL LAW DOES NOT GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 210-212 (2005)
(advocating the adoption of a verdict system of no violation, justified violation, blameless
violation, and unpunished violation). The framework of defenses underlying these verdict
proposals is laid out in Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLUM . L. REV . 199 (1982) (providing a conceptual framework for distinguishing classes of
criminal defenses).
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arises from special excusing conditions and is allowed despite the fact that the conduct is
condemnable. It is the actor, and not the act, that drives the acquittal. The verdict system we
provide in the PMRCP and the Draft Code simply carries this reasoning to its full and logical
conclusion. It is a system that provides, for all acquittals, the clarity that the "not guilty by reason
of insanity" verdict provides for insanity acquittals.
Under the Draft Code and the PMRCP, four potential judgments are possible. A
judgment of “guilty” is the only available judgment of conviction, but an acquittal may take the
form of any of three verdicts: “no offense,” “not guilty,” and “not convictable.”166 A verdict of
“no offense” is predicated on a finding that the defendant's conduct did not constitute an offense
or, if it did, that it was justified,167 In other words, what the defendant did is not in fact
prohibited by the criminal law. The verdict reaffirms and clarifies the contours of the rules of
conduct.168
The "not guilty" verdict, in contrast, is entered where a defendant has unjustifiably
brought about the harm or evil of the offense -- he satisfies the objective elements of the offense
definition and does not have a justification defense -- but his violation of the rules of conduct is
blameless, perhaps because he does not have the culpable state of mind required by the offense
definition or because he has a general excuse defense.169 The message of this verdict is to
condemn the act as a violation of the rules of conduct but to exculpate the actor from criminal
liability and punishment.
A judgment of “not convictable” is the most limited form of acquittal, applicable only
upon a nonexculpatory defense.170 Nonexculpatory defenses claim that the defendant cannot be
convicted for the offense due to a reason apart from his own actions and capacities. That is, the
verdict signals that what was done may well be a violation of the rules of conduct and the actor
may well be blameworthy for it, but he is not to be punished because of some reason extrinsic to
rules of conduct or blameworthiness, such as diplomatic immunity or a statute of limitations.171
The issue of whether a nonexculpatory defense applies is usually resolved prior to trial. If the

166

See PMRCP §§ 4.2, 6.6.
See PMRCP, Rule 6.6.
168
The PMRCP direct the court to enter a judgment of "no offense" if:
[T]he defendant does not satisfy the requirements for liability in Section 20 of the
Penal Code because of:
(i) an absence of an objective element under Section 21(a)(1) of the Penal Code,
(ii) a justification defense in Chapter 40 of the Penal Code, or
(iii) any other exemption from liability vitiating the offense harm or wrong.
Id. at (a)(2).
169
See PMRCP 6.6(a)(3) ("The court must enter a judgment of 'not guilty' if it finds that
the defendant does not satisfy the requirements for liability in Section 20 of the Penal Code but is
not entitled to a judgment of 'no offense.'").
170
See PMRCP 4.2; see also DMPC § 15 (requiring that a defendant prove all elements
of a general defense, including a nonexculpatory defense, by a preponderance of the evidence).
171
See ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at § 10.1; see also DMPC ch. 60
(listing and defining non-exculpatory defenses).
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elements of the defense are satisfied, prosecution usually ceases immediately, leaving no
definitive assessment of whether the defendant's conduct in fact violates the rules of conduct or
whether his violation is blameworthy. But the verdict signals that one cannot assume that what
was done in this case is something that the law normally authorizes, or that the defendant getting
this kind of acquittal is necessarily blameless. The latter is important because one might well
wish to attach collateral consequences to this verdict that one does not attach to other acquittals.
For example, the defendant who gets this verdict in a child abuse case due to official immunity is
not necessarily someone to whom the community will want to issue a teaching licence.
Of course, the communicative verdict system proposed here cannot be realized unless the
penal code itself is drafted in a way that allows the adjudicator to make the important distinctions
between the reasons an acquittal is given. The Draft Code was drafted in such a way. For
example, the Draft Code distinguishes between objective elements and culpability requirements
in Section 21. It distinguishes between the different types of general defenses, categorizing them
into chapters of justification, excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses.172 Without these relevant
distinctions explicitly recognized in the penal code, the drafters, and adjudicators, would be
powerless to clarify the important differences between acquittals. (Such a verdict system would
be impossible to implement in a majority of American jurisdictions because their codes fail to
adequately distinguish between justification defenses and excuse defenses.173)
By creating a verdict system that communicates the meaning behind an acquittal, each
criminal adjudication can reinforce and refine the community's understanding of the criminal
law's commands and, thereby, the community's norms instantiated therein. Such a verdict system
can contribute to that important goal that Shari'a seemingly sets for itself: to be not just a fair
adjudicator of the cases of individual defendants, but to be a mechanism by which the law helps
to tell people how to live their lives.
VII. THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING OFFENSES
It is not unusual for a legislature to define crimes as the apparent need arises. Especially
when deviant conduct is well-publicized, lawmakers often enact new criminal legislation to show
that they are responsive to popular concerns,174 even if existing law already criminalizes the
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See DMPC ch. 40 (Justification Defenses); DMPC ch. 50 (Excuse Defenses); DMPC
ch. 60 (Nonexculpatory Defenses).
173
See, for example, the Model Penal Code's combining of justification defenses and
mistake as to a justification excuses in Article 3. For a discussion of this issue, see ROBINSON ,
CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at §8.5.
174
See, e.g., Ed Anderson, Home Invasion Might be New Crime: House is Swayed to
Single it Out, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 8, 1999, at A4 (noting that the Louisiana
House of Representatives passed a bill to criminalize home invasion, despite its recognition that
the state already had laws proscribing burglary, aggravated burglary, and breaking and entering)
See also Paul H. Robinson & Michael Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644-45 (2005) (suggesting that frivolous criminal
prohibitions often pass with little difficulty because legislators fear being labeled "soft on
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conduct at hand.175 Even without the distorting effects of publicity and politics, ad hoc
legislation often produces overlapping offenses. In the U.S., Michigan has a general trespass
prohibition,176 but it also has a separate offense that criminalizes trespass on cranberry marshes177
and another for trespass on huckleberry and blackberry marshes.178 In addition to Illinois’
general forgery offense,179 the Illinois Criminal Code has at least ten separate offenses
criminalizing forgery of particular kinds documents.180 And although Maryland state law already
criminalizes manslaughter generally,181 lawmakers enacted a second statute criminalizing
manslaughter by automobile or vessel.182
A. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY OVERLAPPING OFFENSES
This kind of multiplying of offenses produces serious problems. It creates long and
complex penal codes,183 which make it more difficult to find relevant offenses and to promote
uniform application.184 This is a special problem in a society with little tradition and training in
174
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crime"); David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8
U. PA . J. CONST . L. 809 (2006) ("The result is that criminal law proliferates. Legislatures
regularly add crimes and rarely remove them. Criminal codes become ever broader and ever
more cluttered with obscure, outmoded prohibitions just waiting for some entrepreneurial
prosecutor to use them to extract a more favorable plea bargain.").
175
See Stuntz, supra note 127, at 512 (discussing the breadth of the criminal law);
Douglas Husak, Twenty-Five Years of George P. Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal Law: Crimes
Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV . 755, 770 (2004) ("More typically, the original conduct was
already criminalized, and the new offense simply describes the proscribed behavior more
specifically.").
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Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 750.552 (West 2004). See also Paul H. Robinson et al.,
The Five Worst, supra note 128, at 37 (discussing Michigan's trespass overlap).
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M ICH . COMP. LAWS. ANN . §§ 750.548 (West 2004).
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M ICH . COMP. LAWS. ANN . §§ 750.549 (West 2004).
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720 ILL. COMP. STAT . 5/17-3.
180
See 1 FINAL REPORT (Illinois), supra note 140, at xl n.76-77 (identifying separate
statutes criminalizing the forgery of corporate stock, UPC labels, food stamps, credit and debit
cards, and other items).
181
See MD . ANN . CODE art. 27, 387 (1996).
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See MD . ANN . CODE art. 27, 388 (1996).
183
See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Model Penal Code Second: Good or Bad
Idea? Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST . J. CRIM .
L. 169, 172 n.16 (describing the dramatic increase in length of the Illinois penal code between
1961 and 2003).
184
See, e.g., Robinson & Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation, supra note 162, at 636
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the use of comprehensive penal codes. Yet, even more serious problems arise from the fact that
offenses overlap with one another.
Overlapping offenses complicate the application and interpretation of both provisions.185
According to standard interpretive canons, a code provision must be read so as not to render
another code provision superfluous.186 Where a newly added provision is in fact unnecessary,
because the conduct is already criminalized by another provision, deference to this dictate
requires a court to alter the interpretation of the previously existing provision so as to avoid
making the new provision meaningless. This exercise, of course, only introduces confusion into
the application of the code. Legislators see the political usefulness of showing their constituents
that they are responsive but rarely see that the unneeded "solution" often serves only to create a
problem.
Another problem with overlapping offenses is the difficulty it creates for rational grading
of offenses. Basic fairness dictates that offenders who commit like offenses should receive
similar punishments, all other things being equal, but overlapping offenses invite inconsistent
punishments. For example, an Illinois “reckless conduct” statute sets the penalty for endangering
bodily safety as a Class A misdemeanor.187 Instead of relying on this provision or even
appending separate subsections with greater punishment possibilities, Illinois enacted multiple
overlapping offenses criminalizing subsets of reckless conduct. The penalties imposed by these
statutes depart greatly from the simple Class A misdemeanor without an obvious link between
increased harm (or risk of harm) and increased punishment.188 As another example, the Illinois
Code grades unsworn falsification to authorities as a petty offense in some cases and a Class 1
felony in others, with no apparent explanation.189 The process of ad hoc legislation commonly
operates without regard, or perhaps even knowledge, of what is already on the books.
Another danger in overlapping offenses lies in variations in the exercise of discretion that
can exist between different prosecutors. For the same conduct, one prosecutor may charge the
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(noting that complexity and multiple prohibitions hamper the criminal law's notice function to
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Id. at 639.
186
See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) ("A
statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided.");
Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) ("[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of
statutes that render language superfluous").
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20 ILL. COMP. STAT . 5/12-5 (West 2005).
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See Robinson & Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation, supra note 162, at 643 n.39
(finding eight risk creation offenses, ranging in penalty from Class A misdemeanors to Class 2
felonies); see also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY , JUSTICE , LIABILITY & BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) (suggesting shared intuitive notions of
punishment distribution).
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See 1 FINAL REPORT (Illinois), supra note 140, at xlv n.85 (noting that a false
statement related to obtaining a liquor license is a petty offense while a false statement in
application for public assistance is a Class 1 felony).
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more serious of the overlapping offenses, while another charges the less serious. As a result, the
offender's punishment may depend not on what he did, but on his luck in the particular
prosecutor assigned his case.
A related problem from overlapping offenses is that it gives individual prosecutors
improper discretion to manipulate punishment by deciding under which statute to charge a
defendant. The prosecutor’s charging decision sets the maximum penalty to which the defendant
may be subjected and can set a minimum as well. In Massachusetts, for example, a prosecutor’s
decision to bring a charge of "prize fighting" instead of "boxing" leads to a maximum sentence of
ten years rather than three months.190 In Illinois, a defendant accused of fraudulently obtaining
public benefits can face a maximum of either five years or fifteen years in prison depending
under which fraud statute the prosecutor charges the offender.191 When a prosecutor, rather than
a judge or jury, determines an offender's penalty, he undercuts the adjudicative authority that is
more appropriately vested in the more impartial judicial branch.
Where the same conduct is punishable under two or more statutes, the prosecutor can also
double (or triple) the offender’s punishment by charging under all statutes.192 In Pennsylvania,
for example, buying a small amount of marijuana could bring charges for possession of a
controlled substance,193 purchase of a controlled substance,194 marijuana possession,195 and a drug
paraphernalia charge stemming simply from a plastic sandwich bag containing the marijuana.196
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Compare Mass. GEN . LAWS ANN . ch 265, § 9 (West 2000), with id. ch 265, § 12
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(identifying and discussing the disparity in sentences between boxing and prize fighting).
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Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT . ANN . 5/17-6 (Michie 1993) (setting the maximum
penalty for "State Benefits Fraud" at a Class 3 felony), and 305 ILL. COMP. STAT . ANN . 5/8A-6
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35 PA . STAT . ANN . § 780-113(16) (West 2003).
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3 5 PA . STAT . ANN . § 780-113(19) (West 2003).
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3 5 PA . STAT . ANN . § 780-113(31) (West 2003).
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3 5 PA . STAT . ANN . § 780-113(32) (West 2003). Since marijuana is generally
transported in plastic bags, the paraphernalia offense should not be considered separately from
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The resulting degree of prosecutorial choice makes it difficult to obtain uniform adjudication of
similar violators or to be able to predict what punishment will follow a given offense.
Further, the use of overlapping offenses significantly alters the plea bargaining process to
great prosecutorial advantage. The prosecutor can artificially add overlapping offenses and then
remove them as part of a “deal” or “bargain.”197 In such a deal, the offender receives no
legitimate reduction in punishment for his plea. (“Real offense” sentencing has been
implemented to minimize this problem, but its success has been questioned.198) The use of
overlapping offenses thus increases the percentage of guilty pleas.199 Indeed, it also may increase
the risk of convicting innocent defendants because an individual may choose to plead
strategically, wrongfully admitting guilt to a single crime rather than risking a trial in the face of
multiple overlapping charges.
To summarize, overlapping offenses can cause unfairness and irrationality in the
adjudication of criminal cases. This is a concern not only for its own sake but also because such
injustices can undercut the moral credibility of the criminal law and, thereby, its crime control
effectiveness. The law depends upon its moral authority in a variety of ways: to avoid resistance
and subversion, to gain the efficiency and power of stigmatization, to earn influence over the
shaping of societal norms, and to gain compliance in offenses that are not obviously
condemnable on their face.200 Yet, lawmakers have in the past shown little concern for limiting
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The discretion of prosecutors to set punishment levels can be mitigated by a statutory
provision ("multiple-offense limitation provision") that attempts to limit prosecution for fully
overlapping offenses. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07; DMPC § 94. But there is a limit to
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the creation of new, overlapping offenses or for tailoring their legislation to cover only the gaps
they see in the existing code,201 in part because the dangers from overlaps have never been made
clear.
B. SOLUTIONS
In many countries, the problem of overlapping offenses is difficult to deal with.
Legislatures don't like to undo what they have done. The reasons that prompted legislators to
initially pass legislation may still exist, such as the need to show a valued constituent group that
action has been taken. And it often is difficult to get legislatures to think about the larger picture,
to think beyond the immediate problem at hand. Finally, the large "housecleaning" project that is
required to convert an ad hoc accumulation of specific crime-de-jour offenses into a code of
nonoverlapping offenses is not the sort of project that is likely to energize political support.
But, interestingly, the problem of overlapping offenses is more easily solved in Muslim
countries, like the Maldives. Because the Maldives has little tradition of comprehensive criminal
law codification, the drafters of the proposed code were free to construct a code that from its start
aimed to avoid overlap between offenses. Further, the Maldives has no tradition of large and
complicated penal codes, thus there is not the same constituent expectations that the crime du
jour problem should be solved by criminal code legislation.
The best way to minimize the problem of overlapping offenses is to minimize overlap in
the initial drafting of the offenses.202 This was the approach taken in drafting the Draft Code, by
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See Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2
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See Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century, 66 TEX . L. REV . 1,
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different approach is found in MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, cmt. at 104 (1985). Section 1.07 is
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defining each offense to address a discrete harm or evil, not included in any other offense. Part
of the drafting approach was to incorporate into a single offense all conduct of a similar nature,
then using grading distinctions, or sentencing factor distinctions, to break the base offense into
distinct parts. For example, the Draft Code defines assault broadly,203 then specifies three
distinct offense grades.204 A sentencing factor increase for assaults that occur within the home
allowed us to avoid creating a redundant offense of home invasion.205 Were each of the separate
grading provisions defined as a separate offense, as many modern codes do, a prosecutor could
charge multiple offenses. But by including all such related conduct into one offense, the
structure of the provisions themselves makes clear that the prosecutor can only charge one
offense, and that the different subspecies of the offense are only alterative grading choices, not
separate harms.
This move toward defining a base offense broadly, before breaking it into different
grading categories, has the added advantage of focusing directly on protecting the interest at
stake rather trying to anticipate the ways in which persons might harm the interest. It is
commonly the case that one can violate a societal interest in a very wide variety of ways. For
example, before the promulgation of the Model Penal Code, state legislatures attempted to
anticipate every way in which a person might disrespect a dead body, defining an offense that
enumerated the various ways anticipated.206 Such attempts at enumeration proved futile when a
clearly disrespectful action did not fit into any of the statutorily provided categories. Modern
codes, however, shift the formulation of the offense to a general standard that focuses on the real
harm or evil, rather than the manner of causing it, such as prohibiting conduct that the actor
knows would “outrage ordinary family sensibilities.”207
This move toward more general criminal prohibitions may prompt two legality-based
objections. The first is that general standards can, in addition to criminalizing undesirable
conduct, cover behavior that is perfectly benign. This is a valid concern, as statutes that are too
vague can tend to over-criminalize. But vagueness is not inevitable with breadth. The concept
of “outrage ordinary family sensibilities” has an understandable meaning. It is perhaps a
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offense if he, without the consent of another person, touches or injures such person, or put such
person in fear of imminent bodily injury.")
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See, e.g., DMPC § 120 (b) (2005) (distinguishing assaults into three grades: serious
assault, injurious assault, and simple assault).
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See, e.g., DMPC § 120 (c) (2005) (increasing baseline sentence if assault takes place
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See, e.g., GA . CODE ANN . § 31-21-44.1 (2002) (enumerating possible abuses of a dead
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See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Except as
authorized by law, a person who treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary
family sensibilities commits a misdemeanor.").
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complex meaning, but that only reflects the fact that our intuitions in this respect are complex.
One would expect that there would be some agreement among persons as to what conduct did
and did not meet this standard. In any case, the danger of reasonable disagreement is minimized
by including, as the Draft Code always does, a culpability requirement. That is, typically the
defendant must be shown to have been aware that the conduct would cause the prohibited result.
In each instance, a balance is struck between vagueness and specificity that attempts to minimize
over- and under-inclusiveness.208
Some also may object that the use of general prohibitions rather than more specific
conduct violate the spirit if not the terms of the legality principle in failing to give fair notice.209
But broad statutes, while perhaps less effective at giving constructive notice of the law, are often
more effective at giving actual notice, because they are more easily understood and remembered
than the detailed, complex provisions that are required if the definition is purely conduct based.
For these reasons, the Draft Code seeks to minimize overlapping offense, using careful
drafting and sometimes a shift to more general criminalization standard. The approach improves
the Code's effectiveness in communicating its rules of conduct and, at the same time, improves
its fairness by minimizing the opportunities for prosecutorial abuse.
VIII. THE PROBLEM OF COMBINATION OFFENSES
Combination offenses are conceptually related to overlapping offenses but differ in
important theoretical and practical ways. Overlapping offenses exist when a code contains
multiple provisions that criminalize the same behavior. A combination offense is a single
offense consummated when an offender's single line of conduct constitutes two or more separate,
independently-defined offenses. For example, robbery “simply prohibits a combination of theft
and assault.”210 Other examples of combination offenses, which are common in American and
foreign penal codes,211 include burglary,212 arson,213 and kidnapping.214
208

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 ("A person commits a misdemeanor if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury."). Such a prohibition can replace numerous other rules of conduct while
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Paul H. Robinson et al., Making Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of Conduct and
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See, e.g., 18 PA . CONS. STAT . ANN . § 3502(a) (2005) ("A person is guilty of burglary
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A combination offense typically creates overlapping offenses. For example, robbery,
which combines theft and assault, necessarily creates overlapping offenses because a person who
commits robbery also necessarily commits theft and commits assault. Accordingly, combination
offenses are superfluous in the sense that they add no new definition of criminality. They often
do introduce a grading that did not previously exist, specifying a single, higher grade than either
of the two separate offenses. But the combination offense’s performance of this grading function
is seriously problematic. As explained below, combination offenses in fact hamper rather than
help proper grading because use of the combination offense has the effect of reducing the ability
of the code to assign different grades to importantly different courses of conduct.
Combination offenses sometimes arise because of the same political dynamic that creates
unnecessary overlapping offenses. For example, a high-profile kidnapping led to the recognition
of a federal kidnapping offense,215 even though kidnapping is simply a combination of unlawful
detention and a criminal threat, both of which were already criminalized. More recently, a wave
of well-publicized robberies in Florida in which the victim’s motor vehicle was taken prompted
that state to define a new offense of carjacking.216
But the use of combination offenses is something of historic origin. Because certain
combinations of offenses commonly appeared together before Common Law judges,217 it was
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these repeating factual patterns, rather than logical or conceptual categories, that shaped
Common Law offense definitions.218 Takings alone were theft; but a common variation, takings
by force (theft and assault), was defined to be the offense of robbery. Takings from a person's
house (theft and trespass) was defined as burglary. Each of these common combinations, with its
own name, became deeply ingrained in the Anglo-American legal tradition, to the point that they
became not only accepted but expected. The drafters of the Model Penal Code, despite some
reservations, felt compelled to continue the burglary offense, for example, because “[c]enturies
of history and a deeply embedded Anglo-American conception like burglary cannot easily be
discarded.”219 "If we were writing on a clean slate, the best solution might be to eliminate
burglary as a distinct offense and make burglary an aggravating factor in the grading provisions
for theft."220
Of course, in a society without a codification tradition, it was possible for the code
drafters to write on a clean slate. And, as is discussed below, there were special reasons why the
Maldives needed to avoid the problems created by combination offenses.
A. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY COMBINATION OFFENSES
Many of the problems created by combination offenses are similar to those problems
created by overlapping offenses: they add length and complexity to a criminal code, which
makes it more difficult to use and understand, without adding benefit. Their existence creates the
possibility for prosecutorial manipulation of grading and punishment, by virtue of the
prosecutor's discretionary control over the charging decision. This prosecutorial discretion also
creates the possibility of disparate grading and punishment of similar offenders and, in the worst
case, increases the risk of convicting an innocent defendant.221
The existence of combination offenses also exacerbates the difficult dilemma that
jurisdictions have in dealing with the problem of concurrent versus consecutive sentences.
Consecutive sentences tend to overpunish offenders, by treating each of two offenses as if it were
the only offense with its own sentence. Concurrent sentences have effect of trivializing one or
the other of the offenses, since it adds nothing to the offender's punishment. The better approach
is to avoid overlapping and combination offenses, which then allows punishment for every
instance of independent wrongdoing but without double punishment.

217

(...continued)
burglary at common law).
218
Cf. ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at § 15.3 (suggesting administrative
convenience as a reason why robbery statutes may have been retained).
219
M ODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 221.1 cmt. 1, at 57 (Tent. Draft No. 11
1960).
220
Id.
221
See supra Part VII.A.
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But the most serious difficulty created by combination offenses is its effect in sharply
curtailing the sophistication of the code's grading judgments.222 Consider the offense of robbery
(which is theft and assault). Assume that theft and assault offenses each include three grades of
seriousness. Thus, when prosecuted as two separate offenses, their combination would yield
nine possible offense grading categories.223 If a code has a theft offense with grades a, b, and c,
and an assault offense with grades x, y, and z, then an offender could be prosecuted for any of
nine combinations:

x

Theft Grades
a
b
c
ax bx cx

y

ay

by

cy

z az bz
Assault Grades

cz

These nine possible offense categories take into account all of the grading distinctions that the
code has determined are relevant in judging the seriousness of these offenses. However, the
same code’s robbery offense is likely to carry only three offense grades,224 forcing a compression
of the nine varieties of robbery (theft and assault) as envisioned by the uncombined offenses into
the three categories offered by the combination offense (robbery alone). For the code to be fully
effective in capturing relevant distinctions in behavior, the grading system should recognize nine
grading categories when theft and assault are involved, which is made impossible by the
combination offense of robbery.
The primary argument for retaining combination offenses is that while each underlying
crime is independently punishable, the interaction between certain offenses creates a greater harm
or evil and thereby justifies increased punishment.225 But addressing the interactive effect
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See ROBINSON , CRIMINAL LAW , supra note 49, at § 15.4, at 781 ("A better approach
[than having combination offenses] would be to isolate distinct harms in distinct offenses . . . to
recognize different grades of each offense depending on the seriousness of the particular kind of
violation, and to allow liability for whatever combination of offenses the offender has
committed.").
223
224

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 222.1 cmt 1, at 97-98 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (discussing grading schemes of various state robbery
statutes); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160.05, 160.10, 160.15 (McKinney 2004) (defining three
grades of robbery); ALA . CODE §§ 13A-8-41 to 12A-8-43 (1975) (classifying robberies in to three
classes); N.J. STAT . ANN . § 2C:15-1 (West 2001) (delineating robbery into two grades).
225
The Model Penal Code drafters relied on this rationale in including robbery as a
separate offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 222.1 cmt. 1, at 69 (Tent. Draft
No. 11 1960) ("The combination of penalties for a petty theft and a petty threat or minor violence
(continued...)
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through the creation of combination offenses ultimately harms accurate grading more than
helping it, as discussed above. Drafters can effectively take account of an interaction effect
simply by adding a special grading provision to either of the underlying offenses. A theft
committed in combination with an assault can be given a special grading boost in the grading
provision of either the assault offense or the theft offense.
The kinds of difficulties created by combination offenses – complexity and confusion,
unconstrained prosecutorial discretion, increased potential for unjustified disparity in grading,
and complications in the proper grading of multiple offenses that ultimately must rely on judicial
discretion for solution – are difficulties that are especially problematic for Maldivians and for
other countries which have no code tradition. The lack of experience and training in the
application of codes, among judges and prosecutors, exacerbates the likely effect of the
combination offense difficulties. At the same time, because of the far-flung courts in the
Maldives, there is a greater possibility for disparity in decision making. Aggravating this
problem is the lack of adequate communication facilities, which hinders the ability of the
Ministry of Justice to effectively oversee the courts on outlying islands, further increasing the
potential for inconsistency.226 The Maldivians need a criminal code that is at once simple and
straightforward yet one that is sufficiently comprehensive in its application so as to minimize the
need for discretionary judgments that would bring disparity.
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(...continued)
by no means corresponds to the undesirability and danger of the [robbery] offense."). The
drafters surmised that robbery involves “a special element of terror in this kind of depredation”
and results in “the severe and widespread insecurity generated by the bandit, indiscriminately
assailing anyone who may be despoiled of property.” MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §
222.1 cmt. 5, at 72 (Tent. Draft No. 11 1960).
Other combination offenses have been defended with similar justifications. See MODEL
PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §212.1 cmt. 1, at 15 (Tent. Draft No. 11 1960) ("If the object of
the kidnapping be the commission of another offense, the penalty for the latter, even if combined
with a penalty for false imprisonment, may not be proportionate to the gravity of the behavior as
a whole."). Supporters of California’s burglary statute defend it by referencing the potential for
violence that such a fact pattern creates:
Burglary laws are based primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety
created by a burglary situation. Lawmakers are concerned that the intruder will harm the
occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended crime or that the occupants will panic
or react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting more violence. The laws are primarily
designed, then, not to deter the trespass and the intended crime, which are prohibited by
other laws, so much as to forestall the germination of a situation dangerous to personal
safety. Therefore the higher degree of the burglary law aims to prevent those situations
which are most dangerous and thus most likely to cause personal injury.
People v. Lewis, 274 Cal. App. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d App. Dist 1969).
226
For a discussion of the these and related special challenges in the Maldivian situation,
see supra notes 10, 11, 13, 16, 45-46 and accompanying text.
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B. SOLUTIONS
As with overlapping offenses, the solution to the problem of combination offenses was
quite easier than it would have been in common law countries. Drafters were not faced with the
task of expunging traditional, redundant combination offenses.227 The Maldivians had no
expectation of combination offenses that had to be overcome. Instead, drafters were able to
simply define all necessary offenses, but no more, and use special grading provisions if it was
necessary to take account of a special interactive effect between two offenses. They took what
might be called a "building blocks" approach in defining the scope of offenses, in which each
separate identifiable harm or evil could be represented by a single offense whose grading takes
account of different levels of seriousness of the harm or evil. Thus, the overall seriousness of
any criminal episode could be determined by adding up the offense grades of each of the
"building blocks" involved. The approach offers grading sophistication while preserving
simplicity.228
For example, the Draft Code includes no separate burglary offense. An offender who
engages in conduct that constitutes common law burglary is liable for criminal trespass and any
additional offenses, such as theft or rape, committed or attempted during the trespass. Under the
grading provisions for criminal trespass, intrusion into a dwelling is an aggravated form of
trespass, accounting for the extra harm (the "interactive effect") involved when a burglar
commits his offense by entering a person’s home.229 If the offender committed the trespass in
order to steal something from the home, he commits the second offense of theft or attempted
theft, which has five grades in existing Maldivian penal law.230 Combining the five theft grading
categories with the three grading categories of criminal trespass231 results in fifteen different
grading combinations for a given burglary case. This provides a better estimate of the proper
grade of the full criminal episode than the traditional burglary offense with its usual two or three
grading categories.
Western lawmakers might have understandable hesitancy about what seems to be a
radical departure from the Anglo-American tradition of criminalizing certain combinations of
offenses. However, the Draft Code drafting work suggests that the goals of combination
offenses, even the goal of recognizing special interactive grading effects, can be achieved more
effectively through a non-combination approach. And an added advantage of the more simple
yet more powerful separate "building-block" approach is that it sets the foundation for a similarly
simpler yet more powerful sentencing guideline system, discussed in the next Part.
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See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
228
Note that the "building blocks" approach also provides a means to solve the
concurrent-versus-consecutive sentence problem. A formula in the sentencing provisions
reduces the proportion of the full sentence that is to be served for each additional offense, but all
sentences are consecutive, thus no offense is trivialized. See DMPC § 1006.
229
DMPC § 230(c)(1).
230
DMPC § 210(b).
231
DMPC § 230(c).
52

IX. SIMPLE YET POWERFUL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The previous Parts have touched on the grading function of penal code. Codes not only
define crimes but also establish the relative seriousness of the crimes by assigning each to a
particular "grade" that sets the maximum, and sometimes minimum, sentence that may be
imposed for the offense. The final step in the adjudication process -- the determination of a
specific sentence within the range authorized by the code's grading -- is typically done by the
exercise of judicial discretion or, in the modern trend, through application of sentencing
guidelines. The movement toward sentencing guidelines is driven by a number of factors. First,
sentencing guidelines are thought to have the potential to improve sentencing uniformity and to
minimize the potential for abuse of discretion. Further, they properly preserve the
criminalization and punishment authority with the legislature, letting the most democratic branch
make the value judgments required to determine the relative seriousness of different harms and
evils and to determine the factors that are to be relevant in assessing blameworthiness.
There is an obvious unfairness in similar offenders committing similar offenses but
receiving noticeably different amounts of punishment. Excessive variation in sentences harms
the moral credibility of the criminal justice system by allowing factors beyond the nature of the
offense, such as a particular judge's sentencing philosophy, to influence a given offender’s
sentence. However, since no two offenders or crimes are exactly alike, some sentencing
discretion is needed in any system. The goal of sentencing guidelines must be to allow the
judicial discretion to account for the unique facts of each case but not to preempt legislative
determination of the value and policy judgments necessary in defining the relative seriousness of
offenses and the determinants of blameworthiness.232
Guidelines can also reduce the potential for abuse of sentencing discretion. The vast
majority of sentencing judges may have no inclination toward bias, but even a conscientious
judge can be subject to subconscious biases. For example, it is a well-known psychological
phenomena that people empathize more, and find more, believable people like themselves.233
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For a general discussion of the proper allocation of sentence decisionmaking between
judges and the legislature, see Paul H. Robinson & Barbara Spellman, Sentencing Decisions:
Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM . L. REV . 1124 (2005).
233
F RANCIS BACON , NOVUM ORGANUM , OR TRUE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE
INTERPRETATION OF NATURE 20-21 (London, William Pickering 1850) (1620) (“The human
Understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down . . . forces every thing else to add
fresh support and confirmation . . . [I]t is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human
understanding to be more moved and excited by Affirmatives than Negatives, whereas it ought
duly and regularly to be impartial.”); Angela M. Pfeiffer et al., Decision-Making Bias in
Psychotherapy: Effects of Hypothesis Source and Accountability, 47 J. COUNS. PSYCHOL. 429,
429 (2000) (“When examined as a whole, this research suggests that people tend to preferentially
attend to information, gather information, and interpret information in a manner that supports,
rather than tests, their decisions about another person.”); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2101-02 (1979) (finding that
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Sentencing guidelines also allow the legislature, rather than the judiciary, to set the
factors that will determine the amount of punishment. As is the case with the preference for
comprehensive penal codes,234 as the most democratic branch, the legislature is best suited to
make the value judgments called for in assessing the relative seriousness of offenses and the
factors determining blameworthiness of an offender.235 As in penal code drafting, the legislature
is also preferable for developing sentencing guidelines because it can consider sentencing from a
jurisdiction-wide perspective, unlike a single sentencing judge who can deal only with the case
before her.236 Finally, legislators must attend to a variety of policy issues, such as the financial
resources available to the criminal justice system, which are beyond the perspective of judges.
A. THE SPECIAL NEED FOR AND CHALLENGE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE MALDIVES
These interests make sentencing guidelines important to any comprehensive attempt to
properly assess criminal liability and punishment. For an emerging democracy such as the
Maldives, however, guidelines are even more critical. Young democratic regimes, as well as old
ones, often must work to establish their public legitimacy, and fostering trust in the criminal
justice process is a key element in that process.237 Abuses of discretion, particularly when there
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(...continued)
subjects exposed to bias-confirming evidence regarding the death penalty found the evidence to
be much more credible than equally strong but bias-disconfirming evidence); Mark Snyder et al.,
Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self- Fulfilling Nature of Social
Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656, 663 (1977) (“The perceivers’ attributions
about their targets based upon their stereotyped intuitions about the world had initiated a process
that produced behavioral confirmation of those attributions.”); Mark Snyder & William B.
Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1202, 1205 (1978) (“[I]ndividuals will systematically formulate confirmatory
strategies for testing hypotheses about other people.”).
234
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
235
See generally HENRY M. HART , JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW ch. 5 (2d ed., 1994); Robert F.
Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process Perspectives and Possibilities,
38 AKRON L. REV . 895 (2005); Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV . L. REV .
383, 406 (1908) (“We recognize that legislation is the more truly democratic form of lawmaking.
We see in legislation the more direct and accurate expression of the general will.”).
236
This is not to say that systematic attempts to draft sentencing guidelines always will
do so appropriately. Many sentencing guidelines systems have been drafted in sloppy and poorly
thought-out ways. See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation
of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,121,
18,123, 41 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3174, 3177 (1987).
237
See Ontario Human Rights Commission, Paying the Price: The Human Cost of
Racial Profiling 16 (undated),
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are fears that they may arise from political considerations or ethnic bias, are clearly detrimental to
building confidence in a regime. Inconsistent sentencing practices can also raise questions about
an emerging government’s fairness even when they derive from “innocent” factors such as the
divergent philosophies of different sentencing judges. Finally, established, constitutional
democracies typically have well-developed doctrines that govern the responsibilities of each
branch of government.238 Nations without a legislative criminal lawmaking tradition, such as the
Maldives, are faced with the constant challenge of demonstrating that the legislature, as the
elected representative of the people, plays the central lawmaking role.239 Sentencing guidelines
are thus a means for the legislature to assert control over the criminal justice process.
While the need for a consistent sentencing program was particularly compelling in the
Maldives, the creation of sentencing guidelines presented a unique set of challenges. To begin
with, many jurisdictions that have adopted sentencing guidelines have done so only after working
with a modern criminal code for some time.240 Their judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
thus have experience with comprehensive statutory adjudication schemes even before sentencing
guidelines are implemented. This experience both eases the implementation process and boosted
these parties’ confidence in the ability of such a program to achieve just and reliable results.
Maldivians, like many countries in its situation, lack this experience. Thus, to insure that the
sentencing guidelines were both trusted and applied as intended, the guidelines needed to be
transparent and straightforward to apply.

237

(...continued)
http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/consultations/racial-profiling-report.pdf ("Left unchecked,
mistrust towards the criminal justice system can lead to civil unrest.")
238
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (discussing
the limits on executive power in the United States).
239
See, e.g., Maxwell A. Cameron et al., Presidentialism and the Rule of Law: The
Andean Region in Comparative Perspective 2, 8 (Aug. 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at
http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/template/main/images/departments/poli_sci/Faculty/camero
n/Presidentialism_RuleofLaw.pdf (noting that prior scholars had attributed low levels of
confidence in legislatures to the fall of several Latin American democracies using a presidential,
as opposed to parliamentary system, but suggesting that presidential systems are more functional
once the "rule of law" has been established).
240
For example, Minnesota adopted a modern criminal code in 1963, but the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission was not created until 1978. Although the lag in some
American states may have been less significant, a certain familiarity with modern codes existed
even in those jurisdictions. Moreover, even in jurisdictions without comprehensive criminal
codes, American attorneys have long been accustomed to working with complete codes in other
fields, such as the Uniform Commercial Code and the Internal Revenue Code. In short, in many
western nations, any tradeoff between simplicity and completeness could be resolved in favor of
the latter factor. Maldivian attorneys, judges, and defendants lack this luxury.
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At the same time, the Maldivian judiciary lacks a judicial tradition of independence.241 A
well-established, institutionalized judiciary is likely to create informal pressures to gravitate
toward uniform sentencing,242 which may lessen the need for detailed sentencing regulations.
Not having such a tradition, or even a library of written precedent to apply, creates a greater need
in the Maldives for constraining sentencing guidelines, or at least guidelines giving more specific
optional guidance.
Recent Maldivian policy decisions favoring the use of alternative punishments to
243
prison have amplified concerns about disparity. A judiciary accustomed to incarceration as a
standard punishment may be reluctant to impose non-incarcerative sentences without a means to
translate these new punishments into the familiar language of imprisonment. At the same time,
with a wide variety of punishment methods available, the potential for disparity in the amount of
punishment given to similar offenders is increased. Thus, in the absence of guidelines covering
the full range of sentencing methods, judges may shy away from the non-incarcerative sentences
that are sought to be encouraged or, alternatively, may give non-incarcerative sentences but with
each judge taking a different view of how and when the alterative sanctions are to be used and
the punishment credit that should be given for each. Accordingly, the sentencing guidelines
needed to account for a wide variety of alternative punishments and to provide a means to equate
them with more traditional sanctions.
Finally, the criminal justice process in the Maldives is subjected to a high level of public
scrutiny. Established democracies have, over many generations, developed a reputation for a
certain level of fairness in adjudicating criminal matters. Such a reputation, while by no means
infallible, builds a level of public support, or at least acquiescence. The Maldivian government
lacks this luxury, and any perceived sentencing disparities can produce substantial public
discourse, with the disparity attributed to the nefarious imaginings that commonly follow
undemocratic or weak democratic governments. Accordingly, the success of the criminal justice
reform project rests in part on the sentencing guidelines’ ability to consistently deliver justice to a
degree beyond what has been required in the past.
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See U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: Maldives (2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41741.htm
242
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and
the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN . L. REV . 843, 850 (1993) ("It is difficult
indeed to envision an institutional judiciary that allowed its underlings in effect to ignore the
decisions of those at the top.").
243
Legislatively-prescribed alternative punishments in the United States often include
probation, house arrest, boot camps, drug treatment programs, and community service. The
unique geography of the Maldives also allows the imposition of a term of relocation, or
banishment, to a remote island as a punishment.
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B. SOLUTIONS
These special requirements of the Maldivian situation, and that of most young
democracies, calls for powerful yet simple sentencing guidelines -- in other words, calls for
inventing a new guideline form that did not previously exist. A significant structural innovation
was to integrate the sentencing guidelines into the Draft Code. The sentencing guidelines appear
as Part III of the Draft Code, after the General Part in Part I and the Special Part in Part II. More
important, the Code’s offense definitions include not just a grading subsection but also a
sentencing factors subsection. This allows the guidelines to piggy-back on the offense
definitions themselves, cutting down dramatically on the length and complexity that would be
required by a set of guidelines disconnected from the penal code, as has been typical in the
past.244 It also affirms the conceptual similarity between grading factors and sentencing
factors,245 a resemblance that often seems to have been lost in American law and policy making,
where grading and sentencing traditionally have been treated as two very different enterprises.246
The integrated system gives drafters maximum ability to recognize relevant factors, no
matter whether of great or small effect. An aspect of an offense that should at least double
punishment can be treated as a grading factor. Each increase in grade doubles the maximum
punishment authorized.247 Factors of lesser influence can be treated as a sentencing factor, which
allows an adjustment to a offender’s sentence of as little as 10%. Thus, drafters can calibrate the
effect of a factor with some precision,248 as is commonly needed because offenses within a
particular grade are often of widely varying significance. For example, property damage offenses
commonly are graded according to the extent of the economic harm. But defacing a historic
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See the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a striking point of comparison. Those
guidelines are almost a criminal code of their own.
245
Grading and sentencing are closely related because many sentencing factors define
aspects of the crime that change its gravamen. Grading factors typically define aspects of an
offense that are specific to it; thus, using value or remediation cost is appropriate to define theft
and vandalism crimes, but not assaults. Because of practical limitations, however, grading
typically is limited in its scope and cannot define many aspects of a crime that shared intuitions
of justice might use to assess its gravamen.
246
See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten List, 1
BUFF. CRIM . L. REV ., 225, 248 (1993) ("In the federal system, the existing criminal law in Title
18 is so chaotic and unreliable with regard to grading that the Sentencing Commission was
essentially forced to ignore the relative seriousness of offenses as expressed by their relative
statutory penalties.").
247
Under the Draft Code, a one grade increase has the effect of doubling the maximum
authorized penalty. See DMPC § 92 (setting forth the maximum authorized terms of
imprisonment for offenses of each grade); DMPC § 93 (setting forth the maximum authorized
fines for offenses of each grade). For example, an increase from a Class 2 misdemeanor to a
Class 1 misdemeanor increases the maximum authorized term of imprisonment from six months
to one year. See DMPC § 92.
248
See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
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landmark would widely be considered a more serious crime than vandalizing an abandoned
warehouse, even if both misdeeds caused the same amount of damage. The proposed sentencing
factor system allows the guidelines to distinguish the two cases without having to double the
punishment of the greater harm over the lesser.249
The primary sentencing factors in the Code are general in nature and can apply to a wide
variety of crimes. For example, sentences can be enhanced under the guidelines if an offense
creates a “special harm,”250 if the offender refuses to made a good faith effort to compensate the
victim, or if the offender has a prior criminal record. Alternatively, the guidelines allow
punishment levels to be reduced if the wrongdoer expresses genuine remorse, if a partial defense
exists, or if the crime was committed under extreme emotional distress. Ten such general factors
are defined in the sentencing guidelines (Part III of the Draft Code). These are supplemented by
offense-specific sentencing factors, such as enhancements for committing an assault within a
home and using deception to commit a sexual assault, contained in the relevant offense definition
(Part II of the Draft Code). The sentencing factors are thus brief, and yet account for the most
important situations in which justice requires a sentence more severe or more lenient than the
normal sentence for the offense. They also give the system substantial flexibility. Although the
adjustments created by a single sentencing factor may be small, the aggregated effect of several
factors may be significant.251
Most sentencing schemes either fail to consider factors other than the most basic252 or
attempt to be more ambitious and end up with unacceptable length and complexity.253 The Draft
Code’s sentencing guidelines, by contrast, attain sophisticated results without sacrificing
simplicity. The process of determining a sentence under the Draft Code begins, as is the case
with most sentencing programs, with the grade of the offender’s crime. Offenses are grouped
into five felony grades and three misdemeanor grades. Each grade category is broken down
further in the sentencing guidelines into a baseline sentence, five aggravated levels, and three
mitigated levels. Aggravation and mitigation are determined by the sentencing factors described
above. The relevant factors are totaled together, and the total is used to determine the offender's
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See DMPC § 1102(c).
Examples of such "special harms" include offenses committed in breach of a fiduciary
duty, crimes where the victim is a child, a disabled person, or an elderly person, and other
misdeeds that cause a harm that significantly exceeds the harm anticipated in the basic offense
definition.
251
See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
252
See, e.g., ARKANSAS SENTENCING COMMISSION , SENTENCING STANDARDS GRID ,
OFFENSE SERIOUSNESS RANKINGS AND RELATED MATERIAL (2003) (establishing offender
sentence length only by considering a two-dimensional matrix of offense seriousness and
offender history).
253
See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual vi (2005) (noting that the
federal sentencing guidelines are 515 pages long, exclusive of the table of contents, appendices,
and other organizational materials).
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“box” on the sentencing guidelines grid, and thereby a specific proposed sentence. The proposed
sentencing grid is as follows:254
Felony
A

Felony
B

Felony
C

Felony
D

Felony
E

M1

M2

M3

Statutory
Maximum

25
Years

15
Years

8 Years

4 Years

2 Years

1 Year

6
Months

3
Months

5

22y, 6m

13y, 6m

7y, 2m,
12d

3y, 7m,
6d

1y, 9n,
18d

10m,
24d

5m,
12d

2m,
21d

4

20y

12y

6y, 4m,
24d

3y, 2m,
12d

1y, 7m,
6d

9m,
18d

4m,
24d

2m,
12d

3

17y, 6m

10y, 6m

5y, 7m,
6d

2y, 9m,
18d

1y, 4m,
24d

8m,
12d

4m, 6d

2m, 3d

2

15y

9y

4y, 9m,
18d

2y, 4m,
24d

1y, 2m,
12d

7m,
6d

3m,
18d

1m,
24d

1

12y, 6m

7y, 6m

4y

2y

1y

6m

3m

1m,
15d

Statutory
Baseline

10y

6y

3y, 2m,
12d

1y, 7m,
6d

9m,
18d

4m,
24d

2m,
12d

1m, 6d

-1

7y, 6m

4y, 6m

2y, 4m,
24d

1y, 12d

7m, 6d

3m,
18d

1m,
24d

27d

-2

5y

3y

1y, 7m,
6d

9m,
18d

4m,
24d

2m,
12d

1m, 6d

18d

-3

2y, 6m

1y, 6m

9m,
18d

4m,
24d

2m,
12d

1m,
6d

18d

9d

That proposed sentence is not mandatory, at present, for two reasons. First, no sentencing
program can account for the full diversity of crimes and offenders, so leaving some flexibility is
warranted. Second, the guidelines' novelty also creates some concern; no similar sentencing
scheme has been implemented, and requiring strict adherence to it without field experience
seems imprudent. Nonetheless, the guidelines do gently nudge judges to follow them by
requiring the judge who deviates from them to provide a written justification for any departure of
more than two levels from the guideline sentence. Sentences deviating by more than two levels
also may be appealed to the High Court, further encouraging conformity without demanding it.
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DMPC § 1002.
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In light of the interest in alternative sentences, the proposed sentencing guidelines also
include an equivalency table that equates terms of incarceration with other punishments. This
reduces the disparities between similar cases that often can result when alternative punishments
are used, and may further encourage the use of alternative punishments by giving judges
confidence that these non-incarcerative methods of punishment will carry an appropriate punitive
value. Equivalencies in punishments in the Draft Code are set as follows:255
Incarceration

House
Arrest

Community
Service

Fine - the
greater of:

Banishme
nt to
Another
Island

Intensive
Supervision

Probation

1 year =

2 years

1920 hours

25,000
Rufiyaa /
1 year’s
income

2 years

4 years

6 years

6 months =

1 year

960 hours

12,500
Rufiyaa /
6 months’
income

1 year

2 years

3 years

3 months =

6 months

480 hours

6,000
Rufiyaa /
3 months’
income

6 months

1 year

1.5 years

1 month =

2 months

160 hours

3,000
Rufiyaa /
1 month’s
income

2 months

4 months

6 months

7 days =

15 days

40 hours

500
Rufiyaa /
7 days’
income

15 days

1 month

1.5
months

The Draft Code’s sentencing guidelines are unique in their ability to provide a flexible,
sophisticated, yet simple method for determining an offender's punishment. Our calculation is
that they are within the range of what may realistically be administered by Maldivian judges, but
only field experience can confirm this. The hope is that the use of such sentencing guidelines
will enhance the reputation of the sentencing process, and the criminal justice system generally,
for doing justice. And that confidence in the justness of the criminal justice system can do much
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to create the conditions in which a young democracy can thrive, even given the special demands
placed upon criminal law by a Muslim society.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the special situation that faced penal code codifiers in Muslim
Maldives. On the one hand, comprehensive codification is more important and more likely to
bring dramatic improvements in the quality of justice than in many other societies, due in large
part to the problems of assuring fair notice and fair adjudication in the uncodified Shari'a-based
system in present use. On the other hand, the challenges of such a project are greater, due in part
to special needs for clarity and simplicity that arise from the relative lack of codification
experience and training. But there turned out to be perhaps unexpected advantages to
undertaking a comprehensive codification project in the Maldives. While the lack of a
codification tradition created difficulties, it also gave drafters the freedom to invent new
codification forms that would be difficult to adopt in a society with an entrenched codification
history.
While it was a concern that any Shari'a-based code could conflict with international
norms, in practice it became apparent that the conflict was not as great as many would expect.
Opportunities for accommodation were available, sometimes through interesting approaches by
which the spirit of the Shari'a rule could be maintained without violating international norms. In
the end, this Shari'a-based penal code drafting project yielded a Draft Code that can bring greater
justice to Maldivians and also provide a useful starting point for penal code drafting in other
Muslim countries, especially those with an interest in moving toward international norms.256
But the code drafting project also may have much to offer penal code reform in nonMuslim countries, for the structure and drafting forms invented here often solve problems that
plague most penal codes, even codes of modern format such as those based upon the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which served as the model for most American penal codes.
The challenges of accessible language and format, troublesome ambiguous acquittals,
overlapping offenses, combination offenses, and penal code-integrated sentencing guidelines
have all been addressed.
While it may seem odd that a draft penal code for a small Islamic island-nation barely
rising from the Indian Ocean could provide advances in the United States, we think it very much
the case. This possibility exists because the problems of crime and punishment and people's
views of the same are to a large extent universal.257 That means that the community of learning
on these issues can be world wide, not country specific. And this, in turn, creates the potential
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The Draft Code's official commentary lays out the Shari'a authorities that support a
shift toward international norms on each point. See, e.g., 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE MALDIVIAN
PENAL LAW & SENTENCING CODIFICATION PROJECT 15 (January 2006) (discussing Shari'a
authorities supporting the Code’s burden of proof concepts).
257
See, for example, PAUL H. ROBINSON & ROBERT KURZBAN , CONCURRENCE &
CONFLICT IN INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE , Minnesota Law Review (forthcoming 2006) (reviewing
empirical studies demonstrating wide agreement across demographics and cultures of people's
assessments of the relative blameworthiness of serious wrongdoing).
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for a useful exchange of ideas, as is illustrated by this project of Americans helping to draft an
Islamic penal code for a country in the Indian Ocean.258
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As of this writing, the Draft Code has been approved by the Cabinet and submitted to
the Majlis (Maldivian Parliment), which is currently debating its provisions. See
http://www.mv.undp.org/
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APPENDIX
Daniel Pipes, U Penn Prof for Shari'a, FRONT PAGE MAG ., July 26, 2004:
It is easy to see how Professor Robinson would jump at the chance to develop
what he calls "the world's first criminal code of modern format that is based upon the
principles of Shari'a." Here is an opportunity for a leading criminal law practitioner to do
something completely different – not Anglo-Saxon common law, not Napoleonic Code,
but Shari'a. No wonder he ditched his standard seminar.
And he finds the present Maldivian criminal justice system inadequate, to the
point that it systematically fails to do justice and regularly does injustice. He sees the
need for wide-ranging reforms, and believes that without dramatic change, the system is
likely to deteriorate further. Robinson's preliminary thoughts for reform include such
basics as making the judiciary an independent branch of government, limiting the police's
right to search, establishing the defendants' right to legal counsel, and ending the present
practice of relying primarily on confessions as the basis for establishing criminal liability.
These are worthy objectives, to be sure, but Professor Robinson should stand back
from this project and reassess it. This leading scholar, through his work in the Maldives,
will render more acceptable Shari'a provisions about killing apostates from Islam,
subjugating women, keeping slaves, and repressing non-Muslims (in this light, note the
matter-of-fact comment in the course description that "as a matter of law, all citizens [of
the Maldives] are Muslim").
Rather than cleanse and modernize the Shari'a code, I appeal to Professor
Robinson to reject the Maldive commission and take a totally different approach in his
seminar, critiquing that code's criminal provisions from a Western point of view. He and
his seminar students would then show how this religiously-based legal system contradicts
virtually every assumption an American makes, such as the separation of church and
state, the abolition of forced servitude, the right not to suffer inhumane punishments,
freedom of religion and expression, equality of the sexes, and on and on.
The Shari'a needs to be rejected as a state law code, not made prettier.
Paul Robinson’s Response to Daniel Pipes:
You object to my plan to assist the Maldivians in drafting a new criminal code. I
think the opportunity ought to be enthusiastically embraced.
The Maldives does not allow the classic barbaric punishments of Shari'a, such as
cutting off the hands of thieves or stoning adulterers to death. Indeed, Amnesty
International reports that the country de facto abolished the death penalty for all offenses
more than a half century ago. (And every one of the reforms you mention — independent
judiciary, explicit limitations on police power, defense counsel at all stages, and moving
away from the use of confessions — is something that the Maldivians themselves are now
doing or committed themselves to do long before I ever showed up on the scene).
Does the country impose criminal liability and punishment that I find
objectionable? Yes, which is precisely the reason that drives my interest in helping. I do
criminal code consulting for many countries. A few days ago, one client, China,
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beheaded a person for embezzlement. (Worse than anything the Maldivians have done.)
Should I now refuse to advise them further on what I think a criminal code should look
like? Your strategy of willful disengagement seems an odd way of bringing greater
justice to the world.
The Maldivians are in the midst great social change. A special parliament called
to draft a new constitution met for the first time two days ago; disagreements among the
members spilled into demonstrations in the streets. A young and idealistic Attorney
General, with much credibility with the people, was recently appointed, after police
beatings of prisoners prompted riots. This man and many others in the country have
made serious personal sacrifices to advance the cause of justice for Maldivians. He and
others like him represent the forces of enlightenment that seek to move the country
toward the principles of fairness and justice. When this man asks me to help draft a
criminal code for his country, how could I possibly in good conscience refuse?
My views on criminal justice are well known. No one would think that I am
inclined to tolerate barbaric punishments, nor would they think that I would renounce my
independent judgment and be cowed into silence. (I was the lone dissenter in the
promulgation of the United States Sentencing Commission guidelines.) If someone hires
me to help draft a criminal code, that in itself tells you something about the person's
agenda. If their goal is not fairness and justice, they are only hiring trouble. Why would
they?
If the Western world had beat this country into submission through economic
boycott and political isolation, we would take their request for Western advice to be a
great victory. Why should the request to be shunned simply because some leaders of the
country are people of conscience who by their own choice have sought the advice?
My goal is not to make their code "pretty," as you suggest, but rather to make it
just. And the evidence to date suggests that this is their goal as well.
I do not know how the Maldivian criminal code project will turn out. Like many
criminal code projects, it may go nowhere. I have no power other than the persuasiveness
of my advice, which, experience tells, is often limited. But is it an enterprise worth
undertaking? I would think it shameful to decline.
Pipes’s reply:
Prof. Robinson's explanation of his project makes our differences clear: I focus
on the substance of the Shari'a and he on the Maldivian means to carry it out.
See http://www.frontpagemagazine.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=14372
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